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Jefferson Powell's recent book, The Moral Tradition of American Constitu-
tionalism,' was the point of departure for a series of short papers and con-
versations held in March of 1996 at the Notre Dame Law School.
In a review published before our meeting, Professor Cathleen Kaveny,
one of the participants, characterized Powell's book this way:
A professor of law and divinity at Duke, Powell argues that the history of
American constitutional interpretation is most appropriately analyzed as
a moral tradition within the conceptual framework of Alasdair
MacIntyre's tradition theory. The fundamental purpose of his argument
is theological in nature: heavily influenced by Stanley Hauerwas andJohn
Howard Yoder, [Powell] aims to speak the truth about constitutionalism
to members of the Christian community, thus enabling them to live more
faithfully in American society.2
* Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. The conversation
was sponsored by the Short Chair and by the ThomasJ. White Center on Law and Government at
the University of Notre Dame.
t Director, Thomas J. White Center on Law and Government, University of Notre Dame.
1 Published in Durham by Duke University Press, 1993.
2 M. Cathleen Kaveny, The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism: A Theological Interpre-
tation, 55 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 772, 772 (1994) (book review).
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Another participant, Dean Mark V. Tushnet, in another published review,
said:
According to Powell, "Christians have theological reasons for approving
the role American constitutionalism has played in checking the abuse of
power", but they must resist "the ancient Constantinian error of confus-
ing Caesar with God."3
Dean Tushnet then described the book in somewhat more detail:
Powell begins with a long discussion of MacIntyre's concept of tradition
as "an historically extended, socially embodied argument... about the
goods which constitute that tradition." He stresses Maclntyre's point that
traditions, because they "embody continuities of conflict," always run the
risk of facing a crisis, in the form of an inability to use the tradition's
resources to address "new inadequacies, hitherto unrecognized incoher-
ences, and new problems."
American constitutionalism, considered as a tradition, faces such a
crisis, according to Powell. Its crisis is, for him, "the result of historical
developments in what was until recently a functioning tradition of ra-
tional enquiry." That tradition "arose out of an effort to minimize social
strife and has been concerned throughout its history with constraining
and directing the violence of the state so that the state in turn can control
the violence of the society." It is characterized by two claims: that "it em-
bodies specific moral commitments... and that it is autonomous with
respect to moral argument and political preference (a claim that implic-
itly reinstates the Enlightenment assertion of neutral rationality)." This,
however, is paradoxical, for the tradition claims to be and not be a moral-
ity. Recently, the tradition has confronted and failed to resolve this
paradox.
How were the tradition's propounders able to overlook the paradox
until recently? The reason, according to Powell, lies in the way constitu-
tionalism accommodated arguments about its goods. For Powell, the
constitutional tradition was a tradition of common law reasoning rather
than of political theorizing .... [Common law reasoning] insisted on
reasons rather than relying on authority, and thereby connected to the
Enlightenment tradition. In addition, and this too is connected to the
Enlightenment, the tradition was individualist and contractual. These el-
ements led the constitutional tradition to focus on limiting the exercise
of government power through reason-based law.... Powell supplements
these largely liberal elements with elements drawn from civic republican-
ism and Protestant Christianity. Both, for example, supported a certain
sort of pessimism about how much governments could rely on and har-
ness citizens' virtuous behavior.
In this formulation we can see the germ of constitutionalism's crisis:
the common law was a tradition embedded in a common social life. As
3 Mark V. Tushnet, H. Jefferson Powell, The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism, 45 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 303, 303 (1995) (book review). Excerpts from this review are used with the permis-
sion of Dean Tushnet and of the Journal of Legal Education.
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that common social life disintegrated, so did the possibility of a constitu-
tional tradition tied to the common law. Powell offers a number of what
amount to case studies of common law reasoning in the constitutional
tradition. I think it fair to say that the overall conclusion to be drawn
from these case studies is that the constitutional tradition's common law
element consisted of discussions among elite lawyers about the conclu-
sions they as sensible people would draw from complex arrays of con-
tested or contestable facts.
As Powell argues, there were "unresolved tensions" within the consti-
tutional tradition, in particular the rationalistic, individualistic, and con-
tractual elements associated with the Enlightenment. . . . Powell's
historical narrative suggests that the common law elements prevailed over
the Enlightenment ones through long periods of U.S. history, until the
modem era when the crisis erupted. So, for example, in the antebellum
period the disagreement "between Republican rationalism and Federalist
(common law) traditionalism" was regularly resolved in favor of common
law traditionalism. Abolitionists briefly interrupted the reign of common
law traditionalism during and shortly after the Civil War, when they
"tried-and failed-to rework the intellectual nature of the constitu-
tional tradition." After they failed to "reintroduce[ ] liberal moral and
political philosophy into constitutional law," the common law tradition
regained its ground.
In the twentieth century what Powell calls Modem Theory re-
placed-perhaps better, attempted to transform-the constitutional tra-
dition. Modem Theory was "a radically liberal argument; starting from
the premise that the only legitimate public moral choices are those de-
rived from representative government's aggregation of individual
choices, Modem Theory left no space for tradition-dependent modes of
making public moral decisions." Its crisis arose with the revival of sub-
stantive due process in Griswold v. Connecticut4 and the abortion decisions.
Those cases, Powell argued, could only be justified with "a tradition of
moral inquiry" that Modem Theory had attempted to displace, and that
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe5 expressly rejected.
Powell summarizes his conclusion early in the book: "The Christian
lawyer, school board member, voter, or victim must not be deceived by
the false claims of American constitutionalism to 'establishjustice,' but he
or she need not reject out of hand one means that exists in this society by
which the Christian can speak truth to power."
Powell emphasizes that this defense of democracy rests on the view
that even policies made in the legislature by purportedly majoritarian de-
cision-makers will in fact be made by a "relatively small political elite[ ],"
not sharply distinguishable fromjudges. Powell's theological perspective
therefore leads him to suggest that "there can be no general principle,
4 881 U.S. 479 (1965).
5 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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based on Christian commitments, for deciding in the abstract the proper
balance between majoritarian and judicial decision making." In both in-
stitutions small political elites make the decisions.
According to Powell, this does not imply that Christians should make
merely pragmaticjudgments ("wait and see which institution provides the
more acceptable answer"), because each such judgment evaluates an indi-
vidual decision that has complex and "indeterminate systemic conse-
quences." He rejects "strong support for judicial policy-making in the
name of the Constitution," however, on the pragmatic ground thatjudges
as elite decision-makers are unlikely to be systematically better than legis-
lators as elite decision-makers. 6
Dean Tushnet and Professor Kaveny characterized Powell's answer for
Christians in somewhat the same way. In Professor Kaveny's words:
[Powell] urges Christians to reject the dangerous falsehood of a Christian
constitutionalism. At the same time, he argues that Christian commit-
ments strategically converge to support a general judicial deference to
majoritarian decision making, along with a limited role for judicial activ-
ism designed to protect the voices of discrete and insular minorities and
insure just and efficient governmental procedures. 7
These introductory comments might render the conversation that fol-
lows a bit more intelligible than it would otherwise be. The conversation
began with a presentation by Professor Joseph Vining. His remarks were
followed by a free-flowing conversation, loosely orchestrated by Professor
Robinson, among the participants. After a break, the conversation was re-
started with a presentation by Professor Maura Ryan, followed once again
by a loosely orchestrated conversation. We turn first to Joseph Vining.8
6 Tushnet, supra note 3, at 303-08.
7 Kaveny, supra note 2, at 773.
8 This published version of the conversation concludes with Professor Powell's public lec-
ture, given on the occasion, on the notion of loyalty to the law. We reproduce the lecture last in
this conversation, infra p. 82, in that it is later than the book. It was, however, presented the day
before the conversation.
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THEORISTS' BELIEF
A COMMENT ON TfE MoRAL TArDiTON OF AMmqCAN
COWVSTrIurOlVALSM
by Joseph Vining9
The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism1° is one of those rare
works that leads us to face, at the center of law and legal thought, the larg-
est questions about human life and human purpose. There is a special
reader's shudder, a certain gestural shift in the chair, reserved for that mo-
ment of realizing where one is being led-not to the edge, but to the
center, so that the questions become insistent, and whatever we and others
say and do in the face of them becomes our response to them.
Writing of this subtlety has multiple strands being woven together. I
can almost see Jefferson Powell's hands moving on the loom, with the vari-
ous threads looped about his fingers and some of them held in his teeth.
We must select questions and themes out of this sustained intricacy, and I
suggest three: first, the impact on practical thought and action of what I
will not blush to call cosmology; second, the nature and meaning of de-
mocracy, which runs as a theme from the beginning to the end of the book
as it runs as a theme from the beginning of the United States to the pres-
ent; and third, the implications of conclusions about constitutional law and
constitutional practice for ordinary law and ordinary legal practice, which
will take us to the pessimism voiced at the end of the book-if I may call it
pessimism: Powell may think it rather a form of liberation.
These aspects or themes-cosmology, democracy, and the prospects
for law itself-may allow us to edge toward the question this book presents
most strongly, certainly most strongly for me, which is the place of true
belief in the structuring and expression of legal, social, and what is called
secular life. If we can edge toward that question of actual belief, which
must be pertinent to a theological approach to the book, we can begin to
tie the two parts of this symposium together.
I
William James prefaced his lectures on pragmatism with Chesterton's
observation that "the most practical and important thing about a man is
still his view of the universe.... [T]he question is not whether the theory
of the cosmos affects matters, but whether, in the long run, anything else
affects them."" Oliver Wendell Holmes, our own Holmes, was an example
of the point. He was there with William James at the beginning of this
9 Hutchins Professor of Law, The University of Michigan.
10 H. JEFFERSON PowELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN CONSTITJTIONALtSM: A THEO-
LOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1993).
11 WhLLAMJAmEs, PRAGMATISM 9 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1975) (1907).
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extraordinary century, but he was not like James. Grant Gilmore remarked
that "the real Holmes was savage, harsh, and cruel," living in a "bleak and
terrifying universe,"' 2 and if you have read Holmes's manifesto, The Path of
the Law, you may remember him saying that law was "like everything else"
in the universe, and "the postulate on which we think about the universe is
that there is a fixed quantitative relation between every phenomenon and
its antecedents and consequents." He ended The Path of the Law urging
lawyers to "connect your subject with the universe," presumably as he had
defined it.13 And now at the end of the century Powell has done just that
in this work.
Powell's central thesis, so beautifully grounded in history, is that the
foundation of the Constitution, or of constitutional thought if they are not
the same-the term "constitutionalism" bridges the two-in "Enlighten-
ment" premises portended the situation in constitutional theory he de-
scribes at the end of the book. I say "portend," because it may be there is
nothing inevitable in history, including the history of thought. But in the
form of understanding that is historical understanding, and in the matter
of searching the equipment of one's own mind and the minds of others, we
can see a connection between beginning and end. Eighteenth century
mechanics portended public choice theory, which seems to take even the
democratically elected legislature away from us as a source of law.
The only force within the mind holding this development back-and
this for me is an equally important part of what Powell has brought out-is
legal method itself. From beginning to end The Moral Tradition is a brilliant
assessment of the inner tension in constitutional thought between substan-
tive "Enlightenment" premises, if there can be said to be any substance to
those premises, and common law method and its presuppositions. Powell
describes common law method, which I myself would tend to call legal
method, variously through the book, as analogical rather than deductive
and rule-based,' 4 as inseparable from the minds and informed judgments
of those practicing it, as not assuming the necessity of categorical distinc-
tions between either and or, in and out.' 5 The presuppositions of legal
method have been at war-that is not too strong a term-with the all-em-
bracing mechanics, devoid of substance, ultimately quantitative, that
Holmes gave a glimpse of within himself. They are presuppositions of a
human language that is expressive rather than definitive, of mind that is
not mere process, of voice and person beyond text or texts, of good faith in
reading and in writing, of living value, of phenomena of experience that
cannot be captured but are no less real than those that can be captured, of
a spirit to things that is acknowledged and accepted by many, perhaps
most, perhaps all in actual fact.
This is an inner tension that can be found, I may say, in computer
science today. In the huge discussion that surrounded the chess match
between Kasparov and the newly developed computer program "Deep
12 GRANT GiLMoRE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 49 (1977).
13 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 465, 478 (1897).
14 PowELL, supra note 10, at 76, 95, 139, 249-51.
15 Id. at 86, 238.
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Blue," Herbert Simon, one of the principal founders of cognitive science
and the engineering of artificial intelligence, was interviewed and said in
brief what he has been saying for many years: "The real issue is, What is
thinking? The only way I know of answering that is that there are certain
things that when humans do them, we say that person is thinking. If he
makes a great chess move, we might even say he's thinking creatively. The
only question is, How was it done?"' 6 I have emphasized "thing," "do,"
"how," "done," and "only" in Simon's response. The "only" question, for
Simon, is a question of "how," which is a question of physical event in time
and space, of doing. Questions of saying, questions of substance, are ruled
out by presupposition, a priori. Against this is the shock of the equally
distinguished computer scientist Joseph Weizenbaum, when his therapeu-
tic computer program named Eliza, which he had developed as a parody,
was taken completely seriously by psychologists and psychoanalysts across
the country. His shock was such that he asked for two years' leave from
MIT to write Computer Power and Human Reason.'7
The insight of The Moral Tradition is the depth and distance of the
roots of our current situation. The dynamic the book traces is legal
method itself holding back the unfolding of the implications of the prem-
ises of "constitutionalism." And one question I think it can be useful to
discuss is why legal method held back this development so long. Could it
be that the labor of legal thought has been under an illusion, and legal
thought is today laboring under an illusion? Could illusion, self-delusion,
be so strong and last so long?
Or is it possible the truth is that common law method has been and is
the belief, and the other, here designated "Enlightenment" premises, can
claim only apparent belief? For while it is true in practical affairs that one
can be ambivalent, where cosmology is in question perhaps one cannot be
and is not, as even the father of pragmatism recognized. If cosmology were
a matter of choice, it would be necessary to choose. The modern choice
might be summed up in that word "only" in Herbert Simon's response to
the question whether the computer program "Deep Blue" was thinking:
"the only question," he said, the only question ever, is "how;" not of course
"what," not, above all, "why." John Noonan has questioned Holmes's com-
mitment to his own cosmology, which Grant Gilmore despised so much.'8
It is being revealed that Isaac Newton himself did not believe in the singn-
laxity of his picture of the universe.' 9 If Holmes and Newton did not, are
people today different: true believers? Are lawyers, judges, legal scholars?
The problem is presented not just by the history Powell weaves to-
gether, the oddness that substantive emptiness should have taken so long
to make its presence felt, or I should say its absence. If common law
16 N.Y. Tms, Feb. 18, 1996, at 17 (emphasis added).
17 JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HuMAN REASON: FROMJUDGMENT TO CALCULA-
TION (1976). For Weizenbaum's discussion of Simon, see id. at 128-31, 13840, 260.
18 John T. Noonan, Jr., The Secular Search for the Sacred, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 642, 645 (1995).
19 See, e.g., RicHARD S. WESTFALi, THE LIFE OF ISAAC NEWTON 110-44 (1993). For examples
and discussion, see BETTYJo TEETER DOBBS, THEJANUS FACES OF GENIus 6-13 (1991); FRANK E.
MANUEL, THE RELIGION OF IsAAc NEWTON 75-76, 99-102, 104 (1974); RcHARD H. POPKIN, THE
THIRD FORCE IN SEvENTEENTH-CENTuRY THOUGHT 172-202 (1992). On Newton, see PoWELL, supra
note 10, at 21-22.
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method has a problem with a vision of social organization as points of na-
ked will bound together by a system of property and contract, it is equally
true that a system of property and contract of the kind lying at the base of
so much contemporary economic and political theory has a problem with
its dependence upon law. The problem, as Powell fully sees, is the problem
of authority, of human language and what human language can and can-
not do by itself.
A character in one of Joan Collins's wildly popular best sellers-or
rather a character of one ofJoan Collins's ghost writers' wildly popular best
sellers-advised, "Everyone's a user. Don't ever forget that, my little
love.... If they're not a user, then they are a loser. And you're bloody well
better off not havin' doin's with 'em."20 Thomas Hobbes and Richard
Dawkins21 could not have put it better. The difficulty is, as all practicing
lawyers know when they are engaged in law and not talking about law, that
just to enforce-through orders carried out, and without violence and sap-
ping resistance-the merest contract against someone whose circum-
stances have changed or who has changed his mind, there has to be some
claim of justice in the whole, and some claim of the victim, the loser, on
the whole and identification of the loser with the whole. Milner Ball,
Thomas Shaffer, my colleague Philip Soper wrestle with this in various con-
texts. 22 Social mechanics, the polity as system, pictures contracts as bonds
and shifts of bonds, property as a material thing, bonded or repelling. But
contract and property are not this. The general imagery is almost always
false to the truth of law, which is decision-making, drawing on language,
and asking for deference.
There are times when I part from William James and his sense of the
importance of a professed view of the cosmos, implying as it does some-
thing of a false dichotomy between the mind and the concrete world. We
do exist, we live our lives, love, see beauty, defer, command. All the rest is
just talk that comes and goes and makes no real difference. And there are
other times I think it makes all the difference, and that we may stop be-
cause of it. Blake feared a form of death for humanity, at the beginning of
the period of historical development laid out for us here. You may remem-
ber Blake's "Mock on, Mock on Voltaire, Rousseau:/ Mock on, Mock on:
'tis all in vain!" which ends "The Atoms of Democritus/ And Newton's Par-
ticles of light/ Are sands upon the Red sea shore,/ Where Israel's tents do
shine so bright."23 The question haunts me that haunted Blake-Do
Israel's tents shine so bright? I am a child of the age, living not earlier but
here at the end of the century and at the end of this book, and one more-
over whose initial training was in science and who is consciously and con-
stantly aware of the force of scientific method and its presuppositions. I
know I am like many. Many of us, children of the age, may have to build
20 JoAN COLLINS, PRIME TIME, as quoted in Susan Shapiro, A Trial That's aLittleBit Gothic, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 1996, at A23.
21 THOMAS HOBBES, LmvATHAN (C.B. MacPherson ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
1984) (1651); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENm (1989).
22 MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAw (1993); THOMAS L SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE
PROFESSIONS (1987); PHILIP SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW (1984).
23 THE PORTABLE BLAKE 142 (Alfred Kazin ed., 1976).
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back our conscious or explicit sense of spirit and person by looking at what
we do and say, taking what we say as a form of testimony, what we do as a
form of gesture or dance, and approaching them as critics, analysts, histori-
ans, reporters, just as if we were outside ourselves and no longer had any
privileged access to what we believe and think, our access having been
blocked by decades of teaching and talk through which, from the inside,
we cannot see either form or detail of what is beyond, only light coming
through chinks and cracks.
II
The second thread of The Moral Tradition I might pull out for some
discussion is that of democracy. Democracy appears again and again as an
operative part of successive theories of constitutional adjudication: what
Powell calls the "Modem Theory" symbolized by Holmes, with its deference
to legislative outcomes; in the "footnote four"24 era, with its focus on the
maintenance of democracy; indeed at the very end of the book in Powell's
own turn to majoritarian political processes. Throughout his discussion of
the "negative case" for democracy and the "positive case," Powell is well
aware that anyone making a case for or against, or partially for and partially
against, is simultaneously constructing what it is that the case is being made
for or against.25 It is not at all what arises in its own strange way from a
town meeting, a palpable occurrence that social psychologists study, or
from a string quartet, that music critics discuss.
Reinhold Niebuhr observed that it, whatever "it" was around the
world, was to be viewed in the end as principally a means of removing rul-
ers from power.26 In the United States what "it" is, as lawyers know but do
not wish to emphasize, is a legal phenomenon, not something pre-legal or
extra-legal like the weather, delivering results or material with which legal
thought is to work, but intrinsically legal, woven out of continuing legal
decisions and embodied in legal texts of which questions are asked and
answers and arguments are returned through the exercise of legal method.
Political democracy is not so ostentatiously a legal phenomenon as "share-
holder democracy" in corporate law, that constitutional law of the private
economic world. But the two are not wholly dissimilar. 'Whatever the out-
come of hard-fought battles for votes, the outcome in "shareholder democ-
racy" is clearly, quite self-consciously governed if not determined by
constant decisions about agendas, slates, candidate qualifications, disclo-
sure, advertising, funding, timing, quorums, voting qualifications, selling
votes, patronage and proxies, choice of law, allowability of preliminary
groupings, reorganization of voting units and all the rest through which
unlimited alternatives are reduced to a few to be finally chosen among; and
the effect of the numerical outcome with respect to those few is then mod-
ulated by fiduciary duties of officials and indeed of so-called majorities to
the corporation itself and to minorities and nonvoting interests.
24 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
25 E.g., PowEu, supra note 10, at 287.
26 Id. at 278.
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I have been struck by this ever since I served as a young hearing exam-
iner twenty-five years ago at a national party convention, handling chal-
lenges to delegate credentials. In its complexity, its procedure and its
substance, the work was not markedly different from my previous work in
food and drug law. Certainly the rule of majority rule, that produces what
we call the majoritarian, does not come int6 play until a stage when there
are limited choices, organized alternatives, that are the product of a myriad
decisions of law and are molded by the substantive values of law implicated
in what Powell here calls the tradition. The majority, to which reference is
so constantly made in discussion of democracy, is simply not there at all
without enforcement of responsible legal decisions made under claim of
authority.
Moreover, that most basic rule, the rule of majority rule-which is one
statement of law that can perhaps be called a rule, because it involves num-
bers-can have no authority or claim on us if it itself is the product of a
mindless system winnowing out alternatives and aggregating stated prefer-
ences (though they are gestural or linguistic phenomena) on some statisti-
cal basis. Even the rule of majority rule itself can have no claim unless it is
a statement demanding attention and deference for some reason other
than that it exists-that it is noise vibrating in the air around us.
I might take as an example of these linked problems in thinking about
democracy Alexander Bickel's counter-majoritarian difficulty, which
figures so in the history of modem constitutional theory.27 What are called
"the most memorable lines" written by Bickel, whom "many constitutional
theorists take as their point of departure,"2 were these: "[W]hen the
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act.., it thwarts the
will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises
control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. That, with-
out mystic overtones, is what actually happens .... [T]he essential reality
[is] that judicial review is a deviant institution in the American
democracy."29
But unhappily for the confrontation Bickel seeks to paint, what he
calls "a prevailing majority" is not at all a group of "actual people of the
here and now." They are not here, they are not now. They may be dead,
sick, mad; as a group they are most certainly different from actual people
of the here and now in any physical sense. And Bickel knew that the ac-
tions of voters at a particular time and place within a particular set of con-
straints are being given force at other times and places. One is tempted to
think that Bickel's fame rested in fact upon his seeing that there is a diffi-
culty when what he calls "the mystical" is taken away, and his then re-
turning with what we need not call the mystical, but which is a product of
assumptions that "essential reality" or "actuality' includes more than what
27 I was led back to Bickel by POWELL, supra note 10, at 170-72, and by Steven P. Croley, The
Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHi. L. REv. 689 (1995). On
elected judges, see POWELL, supra note 10, at 171 n.399.
28 Croley, supra note 27, at 711 n.61; Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional
Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (1989).
29 ALEXANDER M. BicKFL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLrCS 16-18 (1962).
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actually happens here and now. For he solves his "counter-majoritarian
difficulty" by visualizing the judiciary as-or at least asking the judiciary to
aspire to become-representative of our "better natures" or representative
of the majority in "the long view" as it would act on "second thought."30
Bickel may have lost faith at the end of his life thatjudges could represent
the majority as it will eventually be.3' The fact remains that what is there
without such representation, without judicial review, is not a given on the
order of a physical sense datum in psychology or neurology, but always
constructed, created by legal decision.
The question then is whether democracy can figure as independently
as it does in the successive theories of constitutionalism before us, or
whether, instead, the fate of politics itself is not bound up with the fate of
the tradition.
III
The suspicion that law may in fact be more pervasive than the terms of
constitutional theory allow leads to the third large question raised by the
sweep of Powell's work. This is the question of the implications of develop-
ments in constitutional law for ordinary law-environmental, admiralty, se-
curities, corporate, tort, contract, property: I need not go on with a
distilled list of law school courses or American Bar Association sections. To
what degree do modem comments on constitutional law, and Powell's
metacomment on these comments, speak to law itself, the everyday we
know the absence of, what people in Liberia, for example, remember when
it disappears?
I mentioned the pessimism of the end of the book, and its turn to
majoritarian political processes. I suggested these processes might be less
separated from ordinary law than is usually implied. Powell points out re-
peatedly as he maintains analytic tension (in a way, I should say, few con-
temporary analysts can or do) that whatever its "rationalist" or mechanistic
principles, the Constitution contemplated law, ordinary law, indeed a con-
tinuation of law uninterrupted except for the substitution of a People for a
King insofar as a King might be thought a source of law. In The Moral
Tradition the inner tensions of the constitutional tradition lead to its decay.
Suppose even that there never was a constitutional tradition. Where would
we be? Where are we now, in ordinary, non-constitutional thought?
Twenty years ago, seeking a thread to carry me through some inquiry
into the way legal thought personifies, and picking the jurisdictional as-
pects ofjudicial review of administrative action, I tried to put aside develop-
ments in judicial review of legislative action that were linguistically similar,
because I did not want to face the question whether the constitutional texts
could be taken seriously, whether they were in fact, as Alexander Bickel
himself had suggested not long before,32 a form of high politics, disingenu-
ous gaming, tactical moves, means justified by the end sought. And one
could try to corral the implications of constitutional thought, say that it is
30 Id. at 25, 26, 238-39; PoWELL, supra note 10, at 170-72; Croley, supra note 27, at 765-69.
31 Pow.LL , supra note 10, at 172 n.403.
32 Bxcn.KL, supra note 29, at 127-69; Pow.LL, supra note 10, at 171.
1996]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
intrinsically different, despite Marbury v. Madison.33 But the challenge Pow-
ell has traced runs too deep to do that. What is said here of constitutional
law affects the ambient world of ordinary law, if our volumes of statutes are
merely grammatical sentences, the product of petty bargaining that can no
more be read for meaning than a pattern of tree branches; if judges in
common law matters are unanchored in method, or tradition as Powell or
Alasdair MacIntyre3 4 or Jaroslav Pelikan3 5 use the term; ifjudges, adminis-
trative officials, lawyers themselves delivering their opinions are only im-
posing their preferences and desires which they can do for the moment if
they successfully avoid sparking violent resistance or playing into the hands
of even cleverer manipulators.
Leon Kass, writing on biomedical ethics, observes and insists as he
does that he intends no aid or comfort to the enemies of science or the
friends of ignorance, "Liberal democracy, founded on a doctrine of human
freedom and dignity, has as its most respected body of thought a teaching
that has no room for freedom and dignity. Liberal democracy has reached
a point-thanks in no small part to the success of the arts and sciences to
which it is wedded-where it can no longer defend intellectually its found-
ing principles. Likewise also the Enlightenment .... 36 Emotivism or
moral relativism, the reduction of all, all, as in a Holmesian cosmology, to
force in a brutal and terrifying world describable ultimately only quantita-
tively, leads in constitutional theory to majoritarian deference, then to a
collapse of faith in democratic politics, and it can go on to sever language
from mind and deny the materials with which ordinary legal method works.
But to follow this progression, one must believe that what I have called
the mathematical form of thought is the only form of thought. To return
to Leon Kass, not a lawyer or political theorist but a doctor writing about
problems in medicine, and his observation that "liberal democracy,
founded on a doctrine of human freedom and dignity, has as its most
respected body of thought a teaching that has no room for freedom and
dignity," we may wonder why this does not raise as much question about
the teaching as about liberal democracy. As we stand apart from Jefferson
Powell's book, at the end of it, and apart from the books and statements
Powell traces and analyzes, we must wonder ourselves what to think and
conclude, as each successive year of law students, newly appointed judges,
new teachers of law, and, I shall add, newly empaneled jurors, must wonder
and then decide for themselves what to think and conclude about law and
legal authority. Powell does not believe that the mathematical form of
thought is the only form of thought, that that is all there is. His critics
might say, "Powell does not believe that, but so what? That is all there is."
"Besides," they might add with a smile, "that that is all there is, is the only
way to explain his believing one thing and us another." But do they believe
what they say?
33 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
34 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988).
35 E.g., JAROsLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION (1984).
36 LEON R. KAss, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HuMAN AFFAIRs 7 (1988).
I am indebted to Roderick M. Hills for the reference.
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Of course the thought may come, What difference does it make to
constitutional theory whether constitutional theorists believe their theories
and the premises of their theories? But such a thought, that belief does
not matter, is itself a little indication of the sway a certain form of thought
has in the mind. They propose, "theorize" as it is said, and it matters not
that they believe. All that matters is whether it works, predicts. The proof
is a posteriori, after the fact: the proof of the recipe is in the pudding. The
difficulty with this is in the notion of "what works" when it is transferred to
human affairs. Peace, authority, mutual respect are not achieved only
through manipulation. What the fact becomes is affected, determined in-
deed, by where you begin. Explanations or proposed explanations without
belief simply do not reach law. A theory-again the word is telling, be-
cause it is a borrowed word-proposed without belief is much like ajoke,
like play; and in deciding what to do and how to act in serious affairs where
much or all is at stake, you turn away for a time from the fun of it and the
pleasure of the player's company.
And so it is not idle to ask, and in fact I think readers tacitly do ask,
whether the legal theorist believes the theory. Jefferson Powell's dog
Psyche appears in his acknowledgements, with a quote from Meister Eck-
hart that "those who write big volumes should have a dog with them to give
them life."37 Rationalists who own dogs, like Powell's Psyche, who nuzzle
them and care for them and weep when they die, are not rationalists. They
betray themselves. They are not emoting, even in their own eyes.
In fact, lawyers are notoriously misleading when they talk about law.
They speak-we speak-constantly of rules, borrowing the language of
physics, rules that carry with them a vision of discrete entities that can be
manipulated logically, definitions that capture the phenomena they define,
and intellectually coercive demonstration, from which the dissenter can es-
cape only by accepting his own irrationality.38 Lawyers speak the language
of rules, but when they engage in law and are observed to engage in law,
their rules are nowhere to be found. There is only a vast surround of legal
texts, from which they draw in coming to a responsible decision, what to
do, what to advise, what to order, which responsible decision of their own
they may cast in the form of a rule, just before it takes its place among
competing statements in the great surround of texts upon which other law-
yers are drawing. Lawyers who favor the language of war over the language
of rules in talking about law similarly betray themselves when they settle
into work on any substantive field.
My favorite example of such uncalculated self-revelation is Grant Gil-
more's fine little book, The Ages of Amefican Law.39 Whenever Gilmore talks
about law he presents it as merely a process, or sometimes as what is "ex-
37 PoWEwj, supra note 10, at ix. The early nineteenth century Lord Chancellor, Lord Er-
skine, went much further. He had a goose that followed him around, and he kept in his library
two leeches to whom he was grateful for medical reasons, giving them names and insisting that
they had different personalities. Cristine Kenyon Jones, Our Dumb Favourites and Their Protectors,
TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 5, 1996, at 13.
38 On the special notion of mistake associated with rules, see PowELL, supra note 10, at 32-33.
See also, on deductive forms of argument, JAMEs BoYD WHITE, JUsTICE As TRANSLATION 28-31
(1990).
39 GRANT GiLMoRE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1978).
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creted" by a process, or as a "mechanism" to provide some minimum stabil-
ity, in which "the function of the lawyer is to preserve a skeptical relativism"
(quipping along the way that "In Heaven there is no law.... In Hell there
will be nothing but law"4 0)-until he comes to his own field, commercial
law. There he speaks in an entirely different voice. He speaks as a practi-
tioner stating law from the inside, rather than as theorist characterizing law
from the outside, full of confidence in his method and committed to his
conclusions, putting aside this opinion or precedent, arguing for the
weight of that opinion or statute, revealing as he works with legal materials
his presupposition of mind and person extending beyond time and place
and of the suitability of language, uttered in a good faith equal to his, for
close and meticulous reading.41 I remember, when I first read a piece in-
tended to trash (as was said) an area of substantive common law, my eye
being drawn to the extensive footnotes, in which was displayed an admira-
ble and delicate use of legal method to construct the law, which of course
had to be done, and the doing of which was not open to any real criticism
except that the presuppositions upon which the author was proceeding in
his footnotes were so very different from those upon which he was proceed-
ing in his text.
If you go back to the beginning of the era The Moral Tradition covers
and to that seminal figure Hobbes, whose impact on modem discussion
about law has been profound, you find an elaborate view of human lan-
guage presented in the first half of Leviathan, making human language
mathematical in character, its reference separate from its speaker, its nor-
mative content a representation of meaningless physical flows of emo-
tion-the view of language that is the necessary foundation of positivism.
When you move to the second half of Leviathan and to Hobbes's own en-
gagement with and discussion of "civil law," this view of language is no-
where to be found, indeed is incompatible with what Hobbes is earnestly
arguing.42 How then is the first half of Leviathan to be read? If you jump
from the beginning to the end of the modem era, or the end for us alive
today, and pick up the strongest statement of scientific positivism,
presented as a system of belief rather than a methodological stance, which
many think is Jacques Monod's Chance and Necessity, you see in one para-
graph the by now well-known summation, "Any mingling of knowledge
with values is unlawful, forbidden." But then only a few paragraphs away you
see Monod speak feelingly of "evil," of "crimes" and "criminal lies."43 Who
40 Id. at 1, 14, 110-11.
41 See, e.g., id. at 31-32.
The obvious solution to Swift v. Tyson was to have pointed out that the only authoritative
statement of New York law on the preexisting debt question had been by Chancellor
Kent in Coddington v. Bay (as well as in his Commentaries). Careless dicta in the Court of
Errors and subsequent confusion of a few lower courtjudges were entitled to no weight.
Thus the law of NewYork coincided with that of the rest of the civilized world and there
was no need to go any further.
Id.
42 HOBBES, supra note 21, at 85-87, 100-18, 321-28.
43 JACQUES MONOD, CHANCE AND NECESSITY. AN ESSAY ON THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF MOD-
ERN BIOLOGY 164, 175-76, 179 (Austryn Wainhouse trans., 1971). For an immediately contempo-
rary example of similar uses of language, see JEAN-PIERRE CHANGEUX & AIAIN CoNNFs,
CONVERSATIONS ON MIND, MATTER, AND MATHEMATICS (M.B. DeBevoise ed. and trans., 1995).
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is he to speak of evil? How can he, after what he has said? Or rather, I
think we should say, he does, he does speak of evil, and so the question for
us is how we are to read what he has said before. Lawyers are trained to do
just this with witnesses, and I think we should do more of it with our own
testimony. Our ear, so finely tuned to apparent inconsistencies on the wit-
ness stand, in judicial opinion, in statutory language, might turn to our-
selves and particularly our discussion of law in general, our own statements
about the nature of the experience we create for ourselves and for others
during our working hours.
IV
Whatever may be concluded about whether theorists believe what they
say, or, more precisely, what theorists do and do not believe when they are
each read as a whole, there is the additional question how what the theorist
believes or does not believe (to bring it right home, what you or I sitting
here believe) is connected to the belief or unbelief of those who do law,
constitutional or ordinary.
If we move from the secondary literature to the primary texts of law,
and seek our evidence directly, we take ourselves back to the problems,
methodological, even epistemological, we touched upon in looking earlier
at the cosmological thread. They seem to me strangely deep, and special to
the developments we discuss here. If, beyond constitutional theories, the
central texts of constitutional law themselves contain assertions that there
is no capacity in us to read or write authoritative texts, then there is no
capacity in us to read or treat as authoritative the texts that assert there is
no such capacity-they certainly can make no claim to authority: they have
burnt the bridge to themselves as they have burnt the bridge to authority,
and left us as if they were not there. And the question then becomes, what
else is there if they are not there?
Only legal method gives an enshrining of atomistic individualism in
Supreme Court opinions any force. Quite aside from the fact that the en-
shrining is in one opinion and not another, in some or many but not all, in
those of one era but not all eras, in majority opinions, concurring opinions,
plurality opinions, it is legal method that leads us to look at them at all, pay
attention to them, pay close enough attention even to begin drawing out
their "rationalism" from the tumble of words in them. To the extent that
what they say makes legal method foolish or impossible, they lose their
force, inevitably, regardless, without our doing. And one might think they
are not to be feared-no more feared than the figure of a man in the
corner of a busy room who says, apparently believing it, that he is not there
and does not exist. If he denies as well your own capacity to see, and he
himself clearly has no stick or gun and is physically harmless, he would
necessarily lose out in the competing claims upon your attention.
And again, determining whether primary texts of law "in general"
deny the reasons for reading them at all would itself pose a special question
of method: one would not determine the matter statistically or by poll, but
by some sense of representativeness of-of what? A phenomenon that de-
nies its own existence?
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I suspect that law may be a phenomenon which we, in our tradition
and institutions of legal study, do not understand very much better than
literary criticism understands literature. Law may be equally tough to elim-
inate by our understanding of it, because it is driven, as is literature, as is
religion, by imperatives of life. Jaroslav Pelikan has testified that, in his
research into the history of Christian tradition, he would now emphasize
far more than h6 did when he began his studies "the nonverbal, or at any
rate the nonconceptual, element of tradition," and he refers to Cardinal
Newman's rather radical openness to "the faith of uneducated men," the
question, in Newman's words, "how much of the ecclesiastical doc-
trine..., was derived from direct Apostolical Tradition, and how much was
the result of intuitive spiritual perception in Scripturally-informed and
deeply religious minds."4
But in a world of thought and action that is so textually based, I still
think that what is in the minds of the highly trained and the consciously
self-reflective is important. And so I keep returning to the importance of
the question of belief. It is important even in its negative form, the ques-
tion of what is not believed as a total and all-embracing vision of human
affairs and of the cosmos that includes the theorist. Recognizing what is
not believed does not carry us through to home, if it cannot be yet said or
articulated what is believed, individually, or in general, here at the end of
the century. But it leaves us open to advance as we can.
I had a bout of sleeplessness in college-perhaps it was from my first
encounter with all-embracing scientific rationalism. Most remarkably, in-
stead of pills for insomnia I was given Wordsworth's book-length poem The
Excursion45 to read at night in the hope it would put me to sleep. There
were only a handful of good lines in it, I was told, and I would know what
those were when I got to them. I did. Apparently everyone does. They
must have remained with me at some level. Recently I came across them
again entirely by chance, without looking for them. They begin when the
universe is compared to a seashell held to the ear speaking of "central
peace, subsisting at the heart of endless agitation. '46 And Wordsworth,
who you remember was present in a sense at the French Revolution, at the
time of the very beginning of the tradition of American constitutionalism,
when "bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,"47 goes on to speak to his readers
then and to us now:
Here you stand,
Adore, and worship, when you know it not;
Pious beyond the intention of your thought;
Devout above the meaning of your will.
- Yes, you have felt, and may not cease to feel.
The estate of Man would be indeed forlorn
If false conclusions of the reasoning Power
44 PELIKAN, supra note 35, at 16, 30, 38, 40.
45 WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, THE ExcuRsION (Oxford: Woodstock Books, 1991) (1814).
46 Id. at 192, Book IV, lines 1146-47.
47 WILIM WORDSWORTH, THE PRELUDE 440, Book X, line 693 (J.C. Maxwell ed., Harmond-
sworth: Penguin Books 1971) (1805).
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Made the Eye blind, and closed the passages
Through which the Ear converses with the heart.4-
CONVERSATION I
John Howard Yoder:49 I had the privilege of advance access to this text,
and so the challenge of following it is a good way, for me at least, to try to
get on board. I think it's safe to use the image of "trying to get on board"
when everybody has their own way of being inter- or trans- or cross-
disciplinary.
My first scholarly publication was in the field of law. It had to do with
an Amish man who sued his church for shunning him. The court in Wayne
County, Ohio, awarded him five thousand dollars for mental pain. I got my
hands very dirty in the county law library, which apparently nobody else
used, trying to do background work in the law of religious associations,
sometime in 1948. I've been trying to understand how legal people think
ever since. It's a privilege to be in this institution with people like Tom
Shaffer and John Robinson around.
The challenge that I sense in this conversation is not, though, between
theology and the law as a discipline, but a larger intellectual challenge in
how we use our heads at all, together. This is instantiated in the way the
Powell book draws on MacIntyre, who's neither a theologian nor a lawyer-
just someone who talks about how we process meaning problems.
I was struck by the patternedness in the paper. There are numerous
ways in which whatJoe calls mathematical reasoning or theory seems to me
to pull the carpet out from under its own feet. There are several different
images like that. You have a person standing in the corner, who tells us
he's not there. If it is the case that these critical moves and analytical
moves, making things more objective or abstract and analytical, do under-
mine the reality of ordinary practice, of ordinary law, if it is the case (as
Powell shows) that when lawyers talk about law, they talk about rules, but
when they do law, they don't talk about rules-could we learn more about
the inappropriateness of theory to do whatever it is we're trying to do?
That's the point on which I wasn't clear from either the major book or the
paper.
If the effect of the Enlightenment move-although it takes 200 years
to work out its impact-is to pull the carpet out from under the capacity
for meaningful discursive community, why do we do it? Is it really only a
process which is self-defeating? Do we then only avoid coming to that con-
clusion because we are slow-witted, or because other people are carrying on
their daily life in a more wholesome way? Then keep the intellectuals from
doing the damage they are potentially committed to doing. Or is there
perhaps some positive role for this analytical process, which we misunder-
stand when we use it in such a way as to cut off the rest of the picture.
48 WoRDsWoRTH, supra note 45, at 192, Book IV, lines 1147-55.
49 Professor of Theology, University of Notre Dame.
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What I didn't find in the sweeping portrayal of disfavor, in the paper
and in the book, is something that would help me as a layman to know why
all of this debate seemed to be necessary to all kinds of people, if what it
does ultimately is to tell everybody that what we are doing is the wrong
thing, and we're asking questions that deny the only cosmology on the ba-
sis of which the meaning of our community life is sustained.
It follows that I would look for additional explanation of why it is ser-
viceable that we would make these critical, intellectual moves. That
wouldn't primarily say that, if we did them well, we cut the floor out from
under our feet, since there might be some right way to do it.
I was very surprised to find at the end of the Powell book his reference
to something I wrote thirty years ago on another subject,50 and yet maybe it
will serve as an illustration of my question: If democracy is good because
the people are good, and the voice of people is the voice of God, which is
the ordinary grade-school understanding of why we need democracy, then
it's self defeating and idolatrous and apparently false.
If, on the other hand, democratic structures are one way in which a
persecuted minority, of abused Jews or Christians, or anybody, can defend
themselves against the oppressiveness of the power structure, which is an
implication of a Niebuhrian description of our society, then the affirmation
of democratic process has a critical negative function, that is not depen-
dent on it's being a saving truth, but just the defensive truth.
I'm wondering whether in a broader sense we can think of the Enlight-
enment project not as enlightenment, but as a defensive strategy, whereby
embattled communities keep somebody else from overpowering them.
Tom Shaffer said he was sorry that this meeting was held too late to
invite Constantine to it. We do have a heritage that is noticed as part of the
history in the book, but the critique of which we haven't gone through.
What is, after all, wrong with the Constantinian tradition? That the right
people will get the right truth and impose it on everybody by a minimum
violence? That's legitimate. What's wrong with that? Well, maybe, Enlight-
enment is helpful to figure out what's wrong with Constantine.
Thus I'm looking for a way to affirm (or simply to accept when it's so
well said) this critique of the mathematical mode of thinking. And yet it
provides an important defense against other modes of thinking, those that
are less aware of the mysteries of evil, mysteries of oppression of individual
people, against which I think these mathematical modes help the
defenders.
Robert E. Rodes, Jr.:51 One distinction that keeps occurring to me is the
distinction between jurisprudence and legal philosophy. Jurisprudence is
the lawyer's account of philosophy and theology. Legal philosophy is a
philosopher's account of both. In other words, law has a place in a philoso-
pher's account of the world, or a theologian's account of the world. Philos-
ophy and theology both have a place in a lawyer's account of what he does
for a living. The latter is jurisprudence, which is what I like to think of
50 PowELL, supra note 10, at 260-92 (1993) (discussingJOHN.HowARD YODER, THE PRIESThY
KINGDOM (1984)).
51 Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
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myself as doing. And the former is something that is done in other parts of
the University. It's not what I do.
That distinction is important. The questions I am asking are: What
laws ought there to be? How do I tell good laws from bad laws? Why do we
have some laws and not others? And what difference does it make to the
clients we serve? In a way, that cuts out some of the inquiry. That is, look-
ing atJeff's book, I saw a description of a tradition, followed by a theologi-
cal critique of it. I said to myself. Why do we owe anything to this tradition?
Why not trash it from the inside as we go, rather than set it up on its own
terms and then criticize it?
I was surprised, yesterday, to findJeff engaged in exactly the enterprise
I thought he should have been engaged in in his book.52 In his lecture, he
talked about fidelity to the law and said, "What do we, as professionals, owe
to our profession?" He ended up by saying, "What we owe to our profes-
sion is to relate the texts that we are given to work with to the values we
share and finally to our commitment to the word of God," which is exactly
the relation between the church and the world that I get out of the Second
Vatican Council's Gaudium et Spes. That is, we who are engaged in secular
occupations, whether plumbing or law, are in dialogue with the church
and the church learns from us what we learn from the world. I had the
feeling that it's a different enterprise than the one that is involved in Jeff's
book and the one we have been talking about this morning.
Marie A. Failinger:53 When I was reading the book, I was convinced
that the common law was going to be the victor at the end, and I was very
surprised to see that it wasn't. Then it struck me from our conversation
after your lecture that maybe you're right with respect to politics. That is
to say, in politics we instantiate some of the ritual of common law.
I was thinking about Pat Buchanan, and why he doesn't win. Why peo-
ple like him don't win. I think perhaps it's the same reason that we have
academics who can take very strong stances on issues; but when a regular
lawyer comes along, she is probably not in the camp of any of the particular
constitutional theorists. There's a ritual to law that lawyers understand,
having been to law school. They understand that when you make a full
argument, you destroy the other person's argument, and what comes out,
in the process of negotiation, is somewhere in between.
I think our political life probably is somewhat similar to that.
We have very strong figures, who make very complete arguments. I
don't know Pat Buchanan well enough to know if that's right as to him, but
he strikes me as that kind of person. He's making a very complete argu-
ment, but it's not a very moderate argument, at least as people perceive
him. He's been pigeonholed as being not a moderate, and therefore,
when the electorate looks at him, they see basically a theorist who has to be
modified in order to deal with realities in life. So I wonder if, in that sense,
our politics has followed our legal practice. We're common lawyers in
political life. We may have instantiated that part of legal practice as well.
52 SeeProfessor Powell's public lecture, given the evening before the conversation, infra p. 82.
53 Professor of Law, Hamline University.
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The word that struck me as odd, in the book, was the word crisis. I saw
all the theorists thatJeff talked about in his book as being engaged in pre-
cisely the dialogue that you, Bob, were talking about, within the tradition,
just as I think the people who are running for office right now are also
engaged in that dialogue within the tradition. They're bringing out differ-
ent aspects of it for us to consider and think seriously about. What we will
come out with in terms of the way to go is not parallel to any particular
form of thought that any of them embody.
Douglas Sturm:5 4 At the outset, I must be clear that I speak from
outside the legal profession-although I speak as one with intense interest
in and some acquaintance with the theory and practice of law.
A profession is, in part at least, delineated by access to a specialized
body of knowledge. For that reason, lay persons address professional mat-
ters with hesitation. And yet, since the presumed purpose of the profes-
sions is, in the long haul, to enhance our common life, surely lay persons
are warranted in making some judgment about the impact of professional
practice on the quality of that life.
In that connection, the moral category that I have missed so far in our
discussion is justice. Justice, John Rawls has reminded us, is the first virtue
of social institutions. Justice, in some meaning of that long-honored cate-
gory, has been, in the minds of citizens and jurists over the centuries, inti-
mately associated with the practice of law. Yet I search in vain for any
explicit attention to the meaning of justice in Jefferson Powell's elegant
theorizing or in Joseph Vining's eloquent commentary.
Consider the final section of Joseph Vining's commentary where he
addresses the vital importance of the question of belief in the ordinary
practice of law. That's a significant observation. As Paul Tillich, the emi-
nent Protestant theologian, insisted, we all live out of some form of faith,
some kind of ultimate concern that infuses and informs all that we say or
do. But that formal proposition, by itself, begs the critical question of legit-
imacy. Not all forms of faith are equivalent. Even Mein Kampf is a confes-
sion of faith, but we are now deeply shocked when anyone so much as
intimates that [Hitler's] confession is legitimate.
Now I would like to think that over the centuries of the legal tradition,
including the centuries of common law tradition, there is something resi-
dent within the grand concept of law that prods our social consciousness
and our social practice beyond genocide, beyond anti-semitism, beyond
slavery-beyond all those institutional forms that are so egregiously unjust.
In keeping with the spirit of the natural law tradition, I would like to think
that there is something to which the legal profession, in concert with our
common humanity, is to be held morally subservient.
The law, that is, contains within itself a principle that goes beyond
itself, that is both in it and outside it. In the same manner, I suggest that
the Constitution of the United States of America reaches beyond itself for
its own justification. That's why the preamble-which enunciates the point
and purpose of the Constitution-is important in understanding and inter-
54 Professor of Religion, Bucknell University.
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preting the Constitution as a whole and in its several parts: "We the People
of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Jus-
tice, ensure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defense, pro-
mote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and to our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America." The Ninth Amendment, similarly, is intended
to indicate that this document and all the practices that it authorizes are
meant to be devoted to a higher or, if you will, a deeper principle: "That
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or to disparage others retained by the people."
It is attention to that kind of higher principle-that resides in law even
as it surpasses and stands critically over all that we do in the name of law-
that I am missing in our discussion so far. I am using the term 'Justice" in
its most encompassing sense to indicate it. Joseph Vining rightly distin-
guishes the reason of common law from the kind of "mechanistic reason"
that we find in, say, Ren6 Descartes or in Thomas Hobbes and suggests that
common law reasoning is more responsive to the needs and concerns of
our everyday life. But even the reasoning of common law has, at certain
times and places, been employed to sustain some utterly inhumane and
unjust practices-for instance, the enslavement of African peoples and the
subservience of women. The legal profession at its best is pledged to hold
the reasoning of common law susceptible to considerations of the higher
principle of social justice, the principle that holds us answerable to the
suffering of peoples throughout the world. Here I would draw an analogy
between the medical profession at its best and the legal profession.
If this thought has any merit, then we shall need to enter into current
debates over the meaning and justification of social justice and how social
justice is related to the practice of law.
John Haughey, S.J:5 5 I'm wondering whether a turn to the subject might
be a more fruitful category to start from, rather than the Enlightenment.
Where is the subject, the person in this whole lawyering process? Kierke-
gaard's insistence on authentic subjectivity might be a good category
here-as opposed to unauthentic subjectivity. Or maybe even a more use-
ful idea is to get to this difference between acting from belief and acting-
well, performing actions-from unreflective behavior. I have found Loner-
gan interesting on the difference between rational consciousness and ra-
tional self-consciousness.
Maybe a helpful distinction would be Newman's idea of the difference
between an assent to notions, and real assent: I can live my whole profes-
sional life assenting to notions, and I can master many notions in order to
achieve success in my profession, and yet what I believe in relationship to
those notions is a card I never play, a hand I never show. Whereas real
assent has to do with belief-so that my personhood is extended into pro-
fessional life by what I am doing. These are briefly three categories that go
back to Joe [Vining's] concern about what is being believed, in these ac-
tions. So, a turn to subject, and authentic subjectivity, rational self-con-
55 Professor of Theology, Loyola University, Chicago.
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sciousness, or the distinction between notional and real assent might
contribute to the conversation.
Thomas L. Shaffer:5 6 If you think about ordinary law, as Joe was talking
about it, I don't think that an ordinary lawyer thinks of loyalty to the law in
terms of real assent. The image that came into my mind when John
[Haughey] was characterizing what Joe said, was the image of an associate
justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, one day, after we had been subjected
to a tirade from the chief justice at the time, who was a despicable bigot.
We had all listened to the tirade, all afternoon. After it was over, the associ-
ate justice showed us out. He was an Indiana country lawyer. I wanted to
ask him why he didn't say anything, but I didn't. But, as he showed us out,
he wanted to say something, and, still, did not want to be disloyal to the
chiefjustice, as, maybe, he should have been. He said, "Well, I'll tell you. I
just try not to make things worse."
That is very much an ordinary lawyer's sentiment. There is, some-
where in there, an assent to the law. But if you ask that ordinary lawyer,
"Do you believe in it?" he wouldn't know what you are talking about.
Failinger: The point I was trying to make is that there is a difference
between what you believe and your liturgy. It seems to me that common
law is somewhat like our liturgy. It is the way we talk about what we believe
in, not what we believe in. I think that your question still remains after we
decide that the common law method is the way we go about practicing
what we believe. If that is what we believe, but we do not have a way to talk
about it, we have a problem. That is why I think common law is a virtue of
our practice. That was my point.
I think that politics reflects this more than we think. That we have a
ritual for talking about what we believe in. One of the ways we do that is
for people to make these very defined arguments, which they may them-
selves not fully believe in, but for the point of putting it out before us, as a
way of our rethinking what we believe in. It is a ritual structure for discuss-
ing what we believe. It doesn't give any substance; common law does not
give any substance to what we believe; and we should be modest about that.
We shouldn't believe that it is the thing. But not to have such a structure
for talking about it would be a real problem. We would have wars: that is
exactly what we had when we had slavery; we didn't have any ritual struc-
ture to talk about it. Whatever problems BrownI 7 had, there was a structure
for working through what we believed about that thing; it was very different
from the Civil War, in terms of the violence.
Randy Lee:58 While reading the book, I found it to be not so much an
effort to define justice, as an effort to articulate a process through which
justice can be defined. I think Professor Vining did a good job of drawing
out half of the equation Jeff was going after, and I think that half is honesty
in the process: in constitutional debate, one has to believe what it is one is
saying if we are going to come to a just result.
56 Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
57 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
58 Associate Professor of Law, Widener University, Harrisburg campus.
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The other half of the equation I got out ofJeff's book is that we have
to approach the process of seeking justice with humility: It is not enough
that one believes what one is saying. In addition, a person must be humble
enough to accept that he or she could be wrong. I think ultimately that is
why Jeff defers to democratic process-because he understands that some-
times each of us is going to be wrong. If there is potential for a person to
be wrong, then she must be willing to back off from her beliefs and defer to
others.
One of the things I really loved from the book was Jeff's observation
that "What unites participants in a MacIntyrian tradition is as much the
problems they think important as the answers they think correct."59 That
to me really calls for humility-that we are not in the process simply be-
cause we believe that we are right, but we are in the process because we
believe the questions being discussed are appropriate. People are to en-
gage in this process because they believe that it is only through our partici-
pation in the process with others, in that exchange of ideas that we are
going to get the right answer. What matters is not that one brings the right
answers to the process; it is that one participates in the process honestly
and humbly. That kind of participation is what will get us to the right
answer.
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.:6 0 One other thing might be added, and
that is the connection between overlapping communities and what John
Rawls has called "overlapping consensus."61 Responsive, appropriate
modes of discourse show respect for difference, and enable us to search for
answers to the kind of hard questions that Doug put to us, that faiths or
pseudo-faiths may be heresies, that some religious judgments may be
wrong. This is not simply a view espoused by Roman Catholics. Eastern
Orthodoxy said this of Rome in 1054. And the Protestant Reformation
most assuredly said this of Rome. And these judgments about Roman Ca-
tholicism are not just historical relics confined to the eleventh or the six-
teenth century. They are current attitudes with contemporary effects.
Almost any century is replete with examples of violence stemming from
these judgments and attitudes toward the beliefs and faith systems of
others.
So we need to focus sharply on John Yoder's question about meaning-
ful community. If the whole philosophical enterprise is to destroy that
question and to reduce us only to our solitary selves, then we're nowhere.
I really did want to stress how strongly I am in agreement, Randy, with
your view of humility. I found that virtue well embodied, Jeff, in the way
you address one theorist after another in your book. You do so with clarity,
with respect, and with fairness. Then you show what is lacking, what is
failing in that vision or that view. But your searching for the truth among
various claims is marked by a humility that I think is admirable. For exam-
ple, Mark Tushnet is here at a conference about a, book that fairly ad-
dresses many of his concerns as a scholar, and yet criticizes him. It may be
59 PowE.LL, supra note 10, at 30.
60 Dean and Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.
61 John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 70OxRDIJ. LEGAL STuD. 1 (1987).
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part of what Doug [Sturm] has asked for. We do need to sharpen our views
of what faithfulness or integrity or faith or belief is, but as we do so we also
need to be reminded of the higher duty of charity, which according to St.
Paul, is greater than faith.62
Mark V Tushnet:63 A number of things have occurred to me. I'll con-
fine myself to two or three. The first is a minor one, coming from the
invocation of Constantine here, and MacIntyre's invocation of St. Bene-
dict.6 4 In my tradition we leave the door open for those people-around
this time of year, actually-if they happen to wander in.
The thing that is most in my mind in this conversation so far is this: I
have formulated it in the following, strongly counter-factual hypothetical:
Imagine that I was ajudge faced with a death penalty case, and I know that
as a matter of positive law the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional.
Now, I know that I am a good enough technical lawyer that I can detect in
any death penalty trial constitutional error sufficient to reverse the convic-
tion, or the sentence, or whatever I care about. So I know that I could write
an opinion reversing the judgment in this case and in any capital case.
Now I have to move from that hypothetical to a sense of myself that
says I wouldn't feel right, although I would be doing this in a technically
acceptable manner, doing it within the modes of acceptable reasoning.
And somehow I have this feeling that Judge Reinhardt 65 can't feel good
about what he does in death penalty cases, because what he wants to do is
say that the death penalty is unconstitutional, and he can't do that. It
seems to me that the observations about authenticity are in this ballpark.
It also seems to me connected to the effort to identify something that
either limits the use of tools of Enlightenment rationality or our under-
standing of the limits of their utility. I guess I would want to say, in the
situation I have described, in the literature of constitutional theory that
reaches the point we have, there is a lot of discussion about prudence and
judgment and phronesis, and practical reasoning, and all that sort of thing,
which is to my mind not terribly helpful, precisely because the same tools
of Enlightenment rationality can be turned against those concepts as were
turned against the things that led people to look for those solutions.
It seems to me that the difficulty in the counter-factual hypothetical
that I posed is that, of the stuff that is on the agenda for lawyers to think
about, both Enlightenment rationality and the common law method un-
derstood as in some way associated with the idea of authenticity, have run
out. And I really don't know what there is after that.
Donald P. KommerS. 66 I would like to go back to something John Yoder
had to say. If I understand him correctly, he was raising a question about
the difference between particular issues and facts or theory. That question
occurred to me when I read jeff's book. When I started to read the book, I
thought he was going to talk about particular moral issues such as abortion,
62 1 Cor. 13:2.
63 Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University.
64 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MoRAL THEORY 245 (1981).
65 Hon. Stephen Reinhardt, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
66 Joseph and Elizabeth Robbie Professor of Government, University of Notre Dame.
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capital punishment, welfare, and things of that nature. But he resists that
approach and discusses constitutional theory at a very high and abstract
level.
It seems to me that there is a divergence between fact and theory, or
between particular issues and constitutional theory. The constitutional the-
ories which seem most prevalent today are almost deliberately designed to
negate the relevance and importance of particular communities, in the
sense that MacIntyre is talking about: we cannot come to valid moral con-
clusions about particular issues unless we come to those conclusions out of
some particular community that has good pedigree and historical validity.
So the question is: How do we as Christians resolve the various and
particular issues that arise in American constitutional law. Now, after read-
ing Jeff's book, I know why he resists talk about particular issues: it's be-
cause this would be a form of Constantinianism, and he wants to avoid that.
But it seems to me that he makes-with all due respect, Jeff-the same
error that Mike Perry makes in his book and that is that he wants to vindi-
cate a particular political agenda. By the way, you describe Mike Perry as a
Christian constitutional theorist. I think he is anything but that, in part
because he writes at such a high level of generality that almost anything is
tolerated in the political or moral community. For example, he has de-
fended obscenity and pornography as moral visions; and if we are really to
respect individuals, we have to respect all of these competing moral visions.
This reduces-although Perry would deny it-this reduces his theory to a
kind of moral relativism that is just running wild.
And what is even more interesting about his theory is that he defends
judicial review because it brings about the right outcomes, in his mind, as
opposed to what would happen if many of the issues we as Christians are
concerned about were to be decided within the framework of the demo-
cratic process.
Now, it seems to me thatJeff is doing something very similar here. He
is concerned about outcomes. On his last page, he defends majoritarian-
ism because it is more likely to bring about the right result than would be
the case if judges made these decisions.
So: What really is the connection between theory and fact? Is there
any constitutional theory out there that would help us come to terms with
these issues? In this sense, I guess I am sympathetic with John Noonan's
view, as Jeff describes it in his book.
I was impressed with your talk yesterday,67 Jeff, because I think you
said that the bottom line was how can we better adjudicate the tension
between politics and law. Maybe you don't need any theory. Maybe this is
what you're saying, in the final analysis, when you talk about the death of
constitutionalism. I take it that you're talking about the death of constitu-
tional theory. I guess that would be your view, too, Mark. Maybe the ap-
proach needs to be much more of a pragmatic one, in which we try to
decide these things within the framework of rational argument, from our
varying perspectives, and with no more value compromise than we Chris-
tians can live with.
67 See infra p. 82.
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Haroldj. Berman:68 Mark Tushnet asked where we go after Enlighten-
ment rationality and legal method have left us where we are. Donald Kom-
mers now speaks of a pragmatic approach to some of the moral issues we
face in the law. I would like to introduce another element into this. Don-
ald defended John Noonan. I am going to defend, I guess, Richard Neu-
haus-not that I agree with him on everything but because I noticed that
Jeff Powell linked Noonan and Neuhaus together as Constantinians.
I would like to defend Constantine. I think he was a great man! He
saved hundreds of thousands of Christians from death and persecution in
Diocletian's terror against the Christians. And then he organized the Ni-
cene Council and brought unity against Arianism, which I don't think any-
body here is for.
Jeff Powell's definition of Constantinianism, at the beginning of the
book, would make us all against it. He defined it in a way which would
subordinate spiritual considerations and values and goals to the material.
And then later the vitriol against Constantine increases; at that point I won-
dered if St. Augustine was not a Constantinian; whether Luther was not a
Constantinian.
What needs to be added in this dialectic and tension between morality
and politics, or justice and politics, are the resources of history. Justice in
the law is one thing-what Jesus called the weightier matters of the law,
which Jeff Powell referred to at the end of his talk: justice and mercy and
faith.
And politics-legal politics, or what we now call "policy"-is another
thing. Politics includes pragmatic considersations, but it also includes ana-
lytical consistency. The technicalities, the "mint and dill and cumin" in our
law, have a normative significance. But there is also-and this is what I
missed in the book-a very strong historical element. The common law is
not just the technique of adjustment. It is not just analogy and non-cate-
gorical thinking. It has also great respect for precedent and historical ex-
perience. It is not the justice that Holmes called "experience," which is
basically politics, but historical experience, that is the life of the law.
I don't see how you can talk about the Constitution simply as an En-
lightenment document. There was a great tension in America, at the end
of the eighteenth century, at the time of the Revolution, between the tradi-
tionalists, who wanted for the colonists the rights of Englishmen, which
were traditional rights, which were communitarian, which were Anglican
and Puritan and Calvinist, as against the philosophes, the so-called Enlighten-
ment people, of whom Jefferson is usually considered to be the most out-
standing. They were primarily Deists and rationalists and individualists.
And that tension is in the Constitution itself, which preserved the com-
mon-law method, in the corpus of which is the whole history of the rights
of Englishmen carried over into America. The Declaration of Indepen-
dence expresses this in Jeffersonian terms, with its unalienable rights of,
presumably, the individual, but then it goes on in the style of the English
Bill of Rights of 1689-the historical rights of the English people, a com-
munity, rooted in historical experience.
68 Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory University.
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Our Constitution reflects this tension again and again. We are notjust
a democracy, in the sense of majority rule. We are an Aristotelian system of
the one, the few, and the many. We have a leader, the President of the
United States, who can rule like a king at times. We also have the Supreme
Court, and the legal profession, who are part of the elite-and we also have
majority rule. Aristotle called this combination the best combination a pol-
ity could have.
We are struggling with this combination. On the traditional side, the
elite side, our deeply Christian and religious heritage is also reflected in
the Constitution. I think this reflects a tension between the seventeenth
century English revolution and late eighteenth century Enlightenment ra-
tionalism. The tension is part of our historical experience and our
tradition.
This is not a tradition in Alasdair MacIntyre's sense; it is the actual
historical experience of the common law and of the Constitution, which
the judges turn back to in order to find normative significance. It is not
just the past which is preserved, but it is an ongoing, historical process in
which lawyers look to ongoing past experience as the source of the law.
It is interesting to explore, as Jeff said, why the courts pay little atten-
tion to the debates going on among the professors. The professors are
debating positivism and natural-law theory, while the judges are also follow-
ing a historical jurisprudence, and the judges ask: Haven't we had this case
before? What does our past experience tell us? What do the precedents
say? Now, Mark [Tushnet], it is partly because some of our judges are try-
ing to weaken the doctrine of precedent, but in most cases, in ordinary law,
in cases we deal with all the time, we all want to know what would be consis-
tent with the past, because we still believe that like cases should be treated
alike. That is the fundamental principle of the common law.
If God is working in history--not merely in morality, not merely in
politics, but also in history-then the law has a past and a future dimen-
sion, and not merely an inner and an outer dimension. For me, Christian-
ity is historical, coming out of the Jewish prophetic tradition, which also is
historical. I think somehow a Christian theology of law must ask where we
are historically, what is the will of God with respect to our historical
development.
We look at these questions not merely in terms of morality and poli-
tics; we also ask where we are situated in time. That may be one of the ways
out of this tension we all feel between rationality and the common-law
tradition.
M. Cathleen Kaveny:69 I apologize for coming in late. I had to teach this
morning. So if this question has been answered, tell me about it.
John H. Robinson:70 None has been answered.
Kaveny: I am still trying to get some of the basic pieces of the argu-
ment into shape. One of the things I am not entirely clear on is this: Why
can we talk about the constitutional tradition as a distinct tradition? Sec-
69 Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
70 Director, ThomasJ. White Center on Law and Government, University of Notre Dame.
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ond, What counts as evidence of epistemological crisis, in the context of
that tradition?
The two questions are somewhat interrelated. The more broadly you
define a tradition, and the more practices and institutions it encompasses,
the less likely that any dispute, at any level in those institutions, with respect
to a particular thing, is going to be a sufficiently large disruption to count
as a crisis.
On the Ninth Circuit there are twenty-eight judges. These judges de-
cide notjust constitutional questions, but broader sorts of federal questions
as well, which are interrelated in a complex way with constitutional ques-
tions. Whatever disagreements they may have on specific constitutional
questions are set within a broader framework of agreement that moderates
the effect of that disagreement on the tradition. So, if you define the tradi-
tion as federal law, rather than as the American constitutional tradition,
any one problem is going to be, I guess, less serious.
What Judge Noonan has said to me is that, because there is so much
real-time agreement amongst the judges, about how to handle ninety-five
per cent of the ordinary-time cases, they have a way of situating an issue on
which they can't agree, so that it does not erupt into a crisis.
And that brings me to my second question: What really counts as hav-
ing a crisis in a tradition? You might say that Roe71 has brought about a
crisis point. Not so much because of the intellectual disagreement over
abortion's moral and legal status, as because we've seen outbreaks of vio-
lence about it. What counts as being a sufficiently grave problem, as precip-
itating a crisis, as opposed to just having ordinary unresolved disputes,
amongst people who have limited vision of what the truth is?
H. Jefferson Powell:72 Joe Vining has raised the question of what the
implications are for what he called ordinary law-the rest of law-of what
one says about constitutional law. I think that connects up to your first
question. It is a very important question. I had trouble, when I was writing
the book, deciding exactly how to tackle it.
There really seem to be two overlapping, but neither concentric nor
perfectly the same, circles. One is the realm of American constitutional
thought, which is neither limited to what goes on within the courts nor
limited to strictly law-type discussions. It is much broader; it takes place in
other settings, and has aspects that are not law-like in the narrow sense.
And then the other circle is constitutional law as adjudicated by
courts-or, perhaps better, constitutionalism as articulated and discussed
in legal terms. What gets done there is all strictly legal, although lots of the
things we talk about never get into court. So there is a problem of execu-
tion, if you want to think about these questions. These circles, although
they overlap, are not identical.
I thought it worked to treat constitutionalism as a distinct tradition, in
some sense in order to get around the problem of dealing with the overlap-
ping but not perfectly contiguous circles. I think it also may work, to some
71 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72 Professor of Law and Divinity, Duke University.
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degree, because constitutional law does have some distinct aspects or ele-
ments to it. I still remain of the view that large parts of constitutional law
are not in working order, as compared to contracts, which I also teach,
where I have a great deal more comfort in trying to get my students to
understand the law. There are problems around the edges, in contracts,
and there are things I don't like, but it is nonetheless a well-functioning
system.
Shaffer: The reason for that is that you're not so solemn about it.
Powell That's probably true.
What counts as a crisis? I think the book suffers from two errors, both
of which are characteristic of many constitutional law professors, myself
included: (1) Paying too much attention to the Supreme Court and (2)
paying too much attention to other law professors.
I think if there is unmistakably a crisis among constitutional law schol-
ars-crisis does not have to necessarily mean something bad; it might be
something fruitful-it is that we plainly do not have what we had, among
many people, in the fifties. We had some raw sense of what the discussion
is supposed to be. If you look at some of the people I wrote about-or
perhaps use other folks-who are doing constitutional theory now, one
thing is that their theories go all the way down. Turtles all the way down.
And many times they seem to be talking about radically different things. So
much so that I wonder why we talk about Robert Bork's positivism as if it
were the same sort of enterprise as David Richard's moral-historical philos-
ophy? They don't look very much alike.
Kaveny: I teach contracts, too. And it is a coherent subject. You're
talking about one thing. When you're talking about constitutional law,
you're talking about a range of topics that are drawn together by the fact
that somebody happened to-a couple of hundred years ago-sit down
and write all these ideas about how we're going to run a country, together,
in one document. So that's one problem in talking about constitutional
law as an intellectual enterprise.
Then the other issue is on the "institution" side. Maybe we're not
looking at this broadly enough. Maybe the academy and the judiciary have
very distinct functions in our society. We have to tie the crisis-as I read
Maclntyre-to the institutions that carry the traditions. From his perspec-
tive, you can't analyze institutions and practices separately. So perhaps
what we need to do is look at the issue more holistically, that is, look at the
legal-intellectual complex in which constitutional law is carried on. Maybe
one of the functions for us folk here in the academy is to kind of push the
envelope, in a way, to bring out the extreme implications of things. Then
judges can take our ideas and reintegrate them into the "normal science"
of the law, in a way that furthers creativity but also is tempered with respon-
sibility. So, maybe, just looking at how bad the debates are in the academy
isn't the test for whether the traditions and the institutions that carry them
are working appropriately.
Powll: Two other thoughts. One is that a probably more interesting
intellectual way of defining the tradition, if I were going to do so without
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pushing in a certain direction, would be to think of the tradition as involv-
ing the interpretation of normative documents that are not court cases.
What I have in mind here is that I think there is a parallel-in some ways a
far more important problem in American law-about statutory construc-
tion. The Supreme Court is riven, sometimes within a single justice's work
and sometimes between justices, over methods that are in the end irrecon-
cilable. Since so much of the work of American lawyers has to do with
interpreting statutes, that would be important.
I think if I wrote the book over, I would try to look at the problem we
have come to have with interpreting documents-the constitution, statutes,
etc.-when we are no longer comfortable doing so with the tools of what
Joe [Vining] was calling legal method. We have radical reform sugges-
tions-some aspects of public choice, economic analysis-these are pro-
posals for radical reform. I take Justice Scalia's approach to statutory
construction to be a proposal for radical reform. All because of the percep-
tion that, to some degree, we do not know fully what we are doing.
Your point about the fact that the judges are successfully going about
their business, in most of their cases, is a very good one, a powerful one.
Within the sphere of constitutional law, there does seem to be, in the judi-
cial area, some considerable evidence of strain. I think the Supreme
Court's own cutting back on the number of cases it hears, and the shift
toward much drier, statutory questions-which I think they probably ought
to be dealing with; I'm not criticizing the positive side of that-reflects a
discomfort that transcends the patent political disagreements among the
justices.
Another example of stress within the judiciary: if you look at what the
Supreme Court says about substantive due process, the legal doctrine
under which Roe v. Wade,73 for example, is characterized, you get a very
different sense about the fate of that doctrine from what is going on in the
lower federal courts. The lower federal courts are busily creating an ever-
growing law of substantive due process. The Supreme Court, at the top,
was doing things that the usual con-law course-which only looks at
Supreme Court cases-would say tended to cabin in and shut off substan-
tive due process. And I think that kind of disjunction between what the
majority of the high court has been trying to do, and what the lower courts
are doing, is another sign of stress.
And so the morning session ended. After lunch, the conversation resumed with
a presentation by Professor Maura Ryan.
73 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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ON POWELL .F THEOLOGY
by Maura Ryan74
In the final chapter of The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism,
H. Jefferson Powell writes: "Christians cannot adopt the language of consti-
tutionalism and remain faithful to their own social vision, but neither
should they simply ignore the state of constitutionalism, for (like all legiti-
mating languages) it can be used as the instrument of our critical and con-
structive communication with our rulers. But which constitutional
language should we use to communicate when the rulers themselves seem
unsure which they speak?"75
How to speak the truth to power without endorsing its pretentions, 76
how to use constitutional argument to give voice to the voiceless, without
being deceived by the false claims of American constitutionalism to "estab-
lish justice." Truth and power are old problems for the Church, but they
take on new shape in the wake of what Powell calls the crisis in constitu-
tional theory: In a time when the Court "lurches from decision to decision
with no obvious rationale other than the specific substantive preferences of
a majority ofjustices," what should Christians favor: deference to legislative
decision or the exercise ofjudicial choice?77
Rejecting the possibility of a "Christian constitutionalism," Powell de-
fends a sort of "both/but" posture: Christians should support majoritarian
process policed by limited judicial activism; 78 Christians should prefer de-
mocracy except where judicial nondeference protects avenues of minority
leverage. Joining Alasdair MacIntyre's critical epistemology with the Chris-
tian social ethic developed in the work ofJohn Howard Yoder and Stanley
Hauerwas, he attempts a new, yea, a truthful reading of American constitu-
tionalism as a moral tradition.
Of all the people in this room, I am probably the least qualified to
offer comment on the success of Powell's project. I have no formal train-
ing in the law and I have but an amateur's grasp of American constitutional
theory. Moreover, I am what you might call a "Gaudium et Spes"7 9 Roman
Catholic; my theological world view (my ethical imagination) has been
forged in the optimism of the common good tradition, shaped by the con-
viction that "when, by the work of our hands or the aid of technology, [we]
develop the earth so that it can bear fruit and become a dwelling worthy of
the whole human family, and when [we] consciously take part in the life of
74 Assistant Professor of Christian Ethics, University of Notre Dame.
75 PovELL, supra note 10, at 277 (1993).
76 Id at 11.
77 Id. at 277.
78 Id. at 291.
79 Professor Ryan's reference is to Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World (Second Vatican Council, 1965), in CATHoLiC SociAL THOUGHT. THE DOCUMEN-
TARY HERITAGE 166 (DavidJ. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992).-Ed.
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society, we carry out the design of God."80 Although I find the critique of
so-called Constantinian Christian social ethics challenging, I remain an
outsider. I cannot speak, therefore, as a lawyer might to Powell's diagnosis
of the state of the constitutional tradition, and I cannotjudge (as others in
this room can) whether Powell has been successful in bringing John How-
ard Yoder's critical ecclesiology to bear on contemporary problems in
constitutionalism.
But, if we can grant Powell less modest goals, if we suppose that he
wants to appeal to a general audience of thoughtful American Christians
and perhaps especially to those who are most likely to be seduced by the
mask of constitutionalism (those clothed whether modestly or scantily in
Constantinian Christianity)-if we can imagine, in other words, that he
comes not just for the righteous but for the sinner-then the questions I
bring to this project might be illuminating at least in some way. If I am
exactly the sort of Christian likely to be seduced, then perhaps we can learn
from what I do not yet see.
One can hardly deny some truth in Stanley Hauerwas's observation
that "we live in a time of progressive dechristianization in which the temp-
tation of the church is to accommodate to the prevailing culture rather
than shape it. '81 We can hardly deny the fact that it is difficult to enter
explicitly religious language into contemporary American public debate,
particularly when religious commitments are likely to conflict with presup-
positions regarding the exercise of individual rights, or that there is a pal-
pable gulf between the conclusion of many religious communities and
religious persons and the "law of the land" on matters such as abortion and
euthanasia. Whatever one makes of Powell's claim that contemporary con-
stitutional theorists "offer little more than an apologia for rule by a liberal
oligarchy," it is easy to share his concern that the possibility for genuine
moral debate for the sake of the common good in the United States has
been eclipsed by the pervasive and powerful languages of rights and pri-
vacy. Powell has brought into sharp relief the complex challenge facing
contemporary Christians: Charged to do justice in the world, we must dis-
cern how to use the power of the world for good when the powers that be
appear increasingly unconcerned with our concern. At a time when the
risks of a simple or unnuanced identification of our American political sys-
tem as the precursor or embodiment of the Kingdom of God seem espe-
cially clear, we find ourselves asking Audre Lorde's question: Can the
Master's tools dismantle the Master's house?
Still, Powell's theological answer leaves me unsettled. To begin with, a
great deal rests on an argument for an anti-Constantinian Christian social
ethic that is, by his own admission, assumed rather than offered. The argu-
ment is familiar enough to those who know the contemporary literature in
theological ethics: Since Constantine, when talking about government, we
have assumed (as Jesus could not have) that we are talking about govern-
ment of Christians and by Christians. We have thus lost the distance which
Jesus maintained between his realism about power and his messianic liberty
80 Id. at 203.
81 STANLEY HAUERWAS, AGAINST THE NATIONS 9 (1985).
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in servanthood. We have not distinguished between an ethic which can
claim the authority of incarnation for the content of messianic servanthood
and that other discourse which talks with rulers about their claim to be
benefactors. 82 To reclaim the distance, "Christian analyses of political
structures and forms of thought must be shaped fundamentally by New
Testament realism about the nature of government power and not by Con-
stantinian assumptions about the compatibility of Christ and Caesar."83
Such a realism entails attending to the fact that coercive exercise of power
by society's rulers (dominion) is a given and that rulers invariably "seek to
justify their exercise of dominion with the claim that their rule is morally
legitimate and socially beneficent."8 4 Obligated to "see and speak truth-
fully,"85 Christians must neither accept secular standards of "political effec-
tiveness and success,"86 nor fall victim to the pretentions of secular
power-they must not begin to tell themselves that the secular state serves
or can serve true human welfare.
But Powell's simple assumption of the anti-Constantinian paradigm
masks the radicality (even within Christian ethics) of the social/political
critique at its heart. It is not, indeed, until we see why even Augustine went
wrong that we understood how deep is the suspicion of secular power in this
account. We learn in a footnote on page 283 that Augustine's practical
political judgements are finally inconsistent with his anti-Constantinian im-
pulses not because he fails to appreciate the limits of the state with regard
to true human goodness, but because he fails to recognize the unavoidable
problems that all coercion poses for the Christian norm of true
community.
But arguing thus implies of course a notion of what "true community"
means for Christians-it implies a position in an old and contentious de-
bate concerning what exactly it means for the followers of Jesus to "take
their signals from somewhere else." Powell does not need here to replicate
Yoder's effort to articulate the meaning of the Church's obligation to "be
like Jesus," but he does need to show why MacIntyre's or Augustine's or
Noonan's8 7 "Constantinianism" is not only incompatible with the perspec-
tive he has adopted, but untruthful, unfaithful to the story that shapes the
church.
The subtlety of Powell's analysis of the relationship between power,
coercion and violence in the context of American law makes even more
clear the necessity of bringing to the forefront the more or less silent theo-
logical narrative that informs this work (that is, the underlying interpretive
context within which we come to understand the distinction between
power and coercion or how power and violence relate). As one reviewer
observed, Powell's theological critique posits no distinction between judi-
82 JOHN HOWARD YODER, THE PRIESTLY KINGDOM 156 (1984).
83 POWELL, supra note 10, at 265.
84 Id. at 270.
85 Id. at 264.
86 Id. at 279.
87 SeeJoHN NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976); infra text accompanying note
97.
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cial authority, governmental power, and state violence. 88 And of course, he
might respond, that is precisely the meaning of New Testament realism:
dominion is fact; the coercive exercise of power by society's rulers is a
given; the empirical state, even when aware of its limited nature, is at best a
sphere of "negative order. '8 9
But there is an important difference between the claim that judicial
authority rests on an appeal to force and the claim that the American con-
stitutional order admits of increasing violence; indeed, resistance to the
seduction of constitutionalism depends upon being able to see clearly just
how pretention masks state violence. Moreover, on his own account, Chris-
tian realism does not require the demonization of the state; "Christians
have no stake in denying the goodness of Caesar's acts when the latter are,
in Christian terms, good."90 But, once having accepted the fact of domin-
ion, how does the Christian know when Caesar's purposes are or are not
good?
In The Politics ofJesus, John Howard Yoder argues that
if the disciple of Jesus Christ chooses not to exercise certain kinds of
power, this is not simply because they are powerful: for the Powers as
such, power in itself, is the good creation of God. He chooses not to
exercise certain types of power because, in a given context, the rebellion
of the structure of a given particular power is so incorrigible that at the
time the most effective way to take responsibility is to refuse to take sides
in favor of the men who that power is oppressing .... Frequently the
faithfulness of the Church has been put to the test the moment she was
asked to follow the path of costly conscientious objection in the face of
the world's opposition.91
Although we only glimpse it in this work, we can begin to construct the
theological backdrop against which Powell's careful exposition of the de-
scent of American constitutionalism into intellectual and moral incoher-
ence becomes the tale of an incorrigible rebellion. As he points along the
way to judicial deference to "evil legislation" (Roe v. Wade92), the solemn
constitutionalization of the right to die,93 the Court's near-eagerness to ad-
dress crime through death penalty jurisdiction,94 he assumes an account of
the Christian narrative which cannot accommodate societal permission for
abortion, euthanasia, and capital punishment. We can see how the refusal
to collaborate comes to mean standing beside all those who are victimized
in a polity defined by protection of the atomized self, and how, if constitu-
tionalism's rebellion takes the form of a dangerous moral incoherence,
88 Kaveny, supra note 2, at 772.
89 POWELL, supra note 10, at 284.
90 Id. at 265.
91 JOHN HOWARD YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS: Vwcit Agnus Noster 185 (1972).
92 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct 1, 1996).
94 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 418 (1993) (under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, newly discovered evidence of innocence which is probative yet weak will not prevent states
from executing prisoners sentenced to death).
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conscientious objection entails refusing to adopt its dangerous morality.
We have here a complex form of Christian pacifism.
Powell's analysis of what an anti-Constantinian theological response to
the crisis of constitutionalism requires is persuasive: Majoritarian processes
policed by limited judicial activism clearly could provide the sort of struc-
tures wherein the Church can stand outside the order, as advocate for
those who are oppressed, harmed or victimized in the social order, and in
which it can, if need be, see and follow the costly path of conscientious
objection.
But in the end, I am left uncertain why Christian social witness (under-
stood in this way) requires an anti-Constantinian social ethic. In his visit to
the United States last year, Pope John Paul II was not shy in invoking the
language of the Great American Experiment or in calling Americans to
renew their constitutional heritage in the service of human rights (espe-
cially poignant was his invocation of "American traditional values" on be-
half of the immigrant). But a brief glance at the recent encyclical
Evangelium Vitae95 suggests that the Pope is neither seduced by liberalism
nor unable to recognize and admonish the violent character of American
law. (Indeed, in Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II argues that abortion and
euthanasia ought to be opposed as acts of conscientious objection.) In the
same way, working well within the prevailing political structure, the United
States Catholic Bishops have consistently brought the voices of the poor,
the alien, the unborn to the floor of public debate.
I will not quarrel with Powell's reservation concerning Michael Perry's
vision.96 But it is not obvious to me why attempts to work out a Christian
rehabilitation of constitutionalism, such as we see in the work of Judge
John Noonan, necessarily fail. Powell rejects Noonan's approach on purely
formal grounds: "Like all forms of Constantinian social thought," he ar-
gues, it "commits a double-barrel error, simultaneously accepting as nor-
mative the coercive nature of the state, while overstating egregiously the
significance of having individual Christians exercise the state's power."97
But the most persuasive arguments against a Constantinian social ethic pro-
ceed on empirical grounds, showing that the Christian, having confused
Caesar with God, no longer questions what Caesar wants. They show how
the Christian who has made this error has become blind (as she inevitably
must be) to the increasing irrationality and violence of the constitutional
"order." That Noonan's Christianity is on a collision course with American
liberalism is undeniable, and, as Cathleen Kaveny has shown in a recent
article in the Journal of Law and Religion,98 the protracted debate over abor-
tion in the United States poses serious questions to Noonan's confidence
in the close and ultimately harmonious relation between the developing
95 POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE [EvANGELIUM VITAE: ON THE VALUE AND INVIOLA-
BILITY OF HuMAN LIFE] (1995).
96 MICHAELJ. PERRY, MoRALImy, PoLIcs, AND LAw (1988), discussed inPowEu., supra note 10,
at 208-24; MICHAELJ. PERRY, THE CONSTrTUTION, THE COURTS, AND HuMAN RIGHTS (1982).
97 JOHN NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw (1976), discussed in PoWiELL, supra note 10,
at 276.
98 M. Cathleen Kaveny, Listening for the Future in the Voices of the Past: John T. Noonan, Jr., on
Love and Power in Human Hist", XI J.L. & RELIGION 203 (1994-95).
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moral vision of the Church and true human wisdom. But what are the
clues we should look for that would tell us that Noonan has fallen into the
unavoidable blindness of the Constantinian? Where are the signs that, con-
fident in the ability of the Christian to achieve a personalized and compas-
sionate justice, he is being led inevitably to the place where he cannot but
fail the test of faithfulness? Where are the signs that here indeed, the
Master's tools will not dismantle the Master's house?
CONVERSATION II
John H. Robinson:99 Last time, those of us who are lawyers were kind of
in charge. We knew what Joe [Vining] was talking about; we could cite
chapter and verse. But now all of us are struck dumb. We're clueless.
We're amateurs where Maura is a professional. She has either the utter
graciousness or the irrational folly to take on talking to a group of lawyers
about constitutional law, and she did it extremely well.
Andrew W. McThenia, Jr.:100 It seems to me that what Maura is talking
about goes back in some ways, to John Howard Yoder's question. What's
wrong with the Constantinian way of doing things? I don't know the an-
swer to that, but it seems to me there is a better defense for the Enlighten-
ment project than we like to offer.
But, it seems to me, one of the things we could say about that Enlight-
enment project, is that it allows dissenting voices to be heard, in that it
allows Jewish communities to talk about Hebrew Scripture, and it allows
Mennonite communities to tell the truth to Caesar in his own language.
That's not a small accomplishment. If the question is, what "footnote
four"101 involves, then, it seems to me, that from the Hebrew Scriptures,
people in that community can tell Caesar some things. And it seems to me
that people in the Mennonite community can tell Caesar some things as
well-some things about justice.
I think that's something to celebrate, not to feel bad about. I agree
with some of the conversation, that there may be a collision course with
questions like abortion; and I don't know the answer to that sort of prob-
lem. It also seems to me that those smaller communities (at least among
those of us who are Christians) can'tjust act like we're victims. That's part
of what's wrong with the politics of this election year, is there's too much
victimology going on. We can tell Caesar some things, in Caesar's own lan-
guage, but not in the language of our story. We can tell Caesar some
things that might make Caesar more honest, whether that's Constantinian
or not. But the world is not to be made right for us Christians. I don't
think that's what our project is. Our project is somehow to learn how to
tell the truth to Caesar and also go back into our faith communities and get
99 Director, Thomas J. White Center on Law and Government, University of Notre Dame.
100 Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
101 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (StoneJ.), discussed in
PowELL, supra note 10, at 159-73.
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the strength to tell the truth. It seems to me, in those communities, we
pray and we celebrate and we ask to somehow know how to serve. That's
worth bringing to the table, whether it's Constantinian or not, and we
don't have to be victims to do that.
Robert E. odes, Jr.:10 2 Maura spoke about Gaudium et Spes. It says that
the church is a sign and a safeguard of the transcendence of the human
person-in any situation. I think that that gives us a way of looking atjus-
tice; and justice, I think, for a lawyer, is, first of all, a concrete judgment on
a particular situation. After we've done that, then we begin putting to-
gether the relation of that particular observation with the whole tradition.
I think the four principles that Jeff laid down in his talk yesterday' 03 are
very useful in doing that.
I had the experience, a long time ago, of being a clerk for a very fine
appellate judge. One day, he got into an argument he felt was leading to
an unjust result, and he couldn't figure out how to get out of it. He said,
"Bob, find me a way out of this." I spent the afternoon looking for a way
out, and found one, and he put it in as his opinion. I think there's a lot of
that goes on. We have an intuitive observation of right and wrong, and we
test our principles by that intuitive observation. I think, as Christians, we
may see the intuition more clearly-and use it.
I'm thinking of the case of the Kitty Eat Lounge, which is a big consti-
tutional law case from South Bend. 0 4 While that case was going on, the
South Bend Tribune did a profile on a topless dancer-who was supporting
her family by topless dancing. The proprietor of the Kitty Eat Lounge was
quoted as saying, "This woman is not an exhibitionist. A woman doesn't
take her clothes off that way unless she's desperate .... ." Well, that never
got to the Supreme Court, and I think maybe it should have gotten to the
Supreme Court. Our business as Christians is partly bringing that kind of
thing before the. courts. That is a truth about our society, and I think,
because we are Christians, we can look at it and form our legal doctrines
around these observations. Again, I return to the scenario thatJeff laid out
yesterday afternoon.10 5 It seems to be quite inconsistent with the conclu-
sion of his book. But I think it tells us how we can look at reality and turn
our intuitive judgments into discursive reasoning.
I'm going to teach a jurisprudence class this afternoon and we are
going to take up John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. After going over Mill On
Liberty, I'm going to make a hypothetical case about a man with a bucket
and a straight razor who goes down to Skid Row and says, "I'm buying ears
for $50 a pair." I don't think you can stop him without rejecting Mill. I
think everybody who passes by would want to stop him. Again, you put
your legal insights together, out of a Christian recognition of human tran-
scendence, which is what Gaudium et Spes tells us we're supposed to be do-
ing. You can put that together and make law out of it. That's certainly my
project as a legal scholar.
102 Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
103 Professor Powell's lecture, given the day before the conversation, infra p. 82.
104 Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
105 See infra p. 82.
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Thomas L. Shaffer:10 6 Does it bother you at all, when you argue in court
to stop the guy with the bucket and the straight razor, that the most effec-
tive argument might be that what he proposes to do is a danger to public
health?
Rodes That's not the most effective argument.
Shaffer: I know. But you and I, practicing law downtown, know what
argument will work, and, with the judge we have for the day, the most effec-
tive argument might be public health. We could go in there talking about
rights and dignity; it's not going to work. That's when he turns his chair to
the wall. The craft we practice often is a disingenuous craft. I know per-
fectly well why you want to stop the guy with the bucket, but the way to do it
is to help his victims.
Rodes- I might choose to make an argument that will be more up front
with my reasons.
Shaffer: You'll lose.
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.:10 7 What's wrong with doing both?
Laura S. Fitzgerald'0 8 It seems to me that your two examples-the top-
less dancer and the ears-both support another conclusion. That is that
courts may be the worst possible institutions for making these kinds of deci-
sions, because courts typically, by their own process, are constrained to say
yes or no. The fact you raised about the topless dancing-a woman does
this when she's desperate-doesn't seem to me to be answerable by the
First Amendment. But it may be answerable by decisions like: How are we
distributing wealth? How are we taking care of people who are left to take
care of children with no means but to dance in bars?
This is one of the advantages that legislatures have: they are allowed
to look at alternatives and a cluster of policies to respond to the problem
and actually consider a fact like the dancer's poverty. That fact, at least
under current First Amendment jurisprudence, is close to irrelevant,
although it is rhetorically very powerful.
Rodes- At one time, the right to sign a yellow-dog contract was as
strong as the right to dance topless is now. For the same reasons.
Fitzgerald: Right, but my point is not that the topless dancing case was
not answered somehow by the Supreme Court, because clearly it was. My
point is that perhaps the idea that we lawyers have that courts are really
great at answering these kinds of troubling questions is just wrong.
Majoritarian processes, as manipulated as they can be, in fact tend to have
an advantage, because they can look at the world as a whole, in context,
within a web of other problems and other possible solutions. The Supreme
Court cannot say, no topless dancing, and moreover you, State, have to pay
for this woman's children, so they do not starve in the street. But the legis-
lature might be able to.
106 Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
107 Dean and Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.
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Marie A. Failinger.10 9 Why didn't the City of South Bend take into con-
sideration what these women have. I know the Indiana Legislature didn't
do it. That is what it comes up to sometimes in these cases: people who
have not been taken seriously, in a lot of different places, are finally in
court. Everybody I represented when I was a legal services lawyer was some-
body who had not been heard by any other system. The Indiana Legisla-
ture did not care beans about those people.
Imagine a client who says, I went to my poor relief office-to my town-
ship trustee-and I asked for money. The law says I am supposed to get
it-through previous legislatures. We've got the law. The legislature
would say, "So go to court and take care of it there. We're not going to
listen to your plea that you're poor and you're-"
H. Jefferson Powell:110 But they had the law. It would have been a lot
more difficult for the court to do something in the absence of a statute,
because the court lacks the power to craft such a rule itself.
Robinson: By the way, I think that some people here-Bob [Rodes]
and Tom [Shaffer]-have been successful in getting the township trustee
to produce legislatively mandated money.
Failinger: Well that is what I did when I was here many years ago, and I
cannot tell you how many times we went to the legislature to ask for relief
from recalcitrant trustees. And year after year, they did not hear, and so
finally we went to the courts. I understand there is litigiousness in our
society and so forth, but for the people who are not heard, so often court
has been the place where they have to go.
Fitzgerald: My point is not that our legislatures are always listening, but
that we have a political system, an electoral system, and a system of constitu-
ent representation, which itself is supposed to be at least a parallel process
for addressing these issues, for addressing issues of justice, equality, and
starvation, and the kind of indignity that follows from the lack of those
things.
It seems to me that part of the problem we have is that we are in fact
only discussing the relatively easy question-with just a bunch of lawyers,
people in the academic community, and within a tradition that, although
rich, is relatively constrained. We're trying to decide the role of constitu-
tional law when in fact the real action is going on in politics. In some ways,
our real problem with the Constitution is to figure out how to make politics
constitutional, not how to make good constitutional lawyers.
We're already within a tradition and, even with disagreements, it's a
relatively small traditional spectrum, whereas the politicians who are run-
ning and creating communities, and making painful and powerful deci-
sions like the one you are talking about-that political reality seems to be
outside of any tradition that any of us lawyers can really put a finger on, in
order to talk about how to make politics just, and how to make those politi-
cians humble and fair. It's not that the legislature is more likely to give the
109 Professor of Law, Hamline University.
110 Professor of Law and Divinity, Duke University.
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right answer, but we lawyers are ignoring electoral politics and constituent-
based politics altogether when we talk about what the Constitution should
mean.
M. Cathleen Kaveny:"' I would like to shift it back toward a theological
analysis for a second or so. I felt that the invocation of the debate over
pacifism was actually an extremely helpful move, because I think that de-
bate provides illumination of some of the issues that are going on here, in
our analysis of the proper participation of Christians and the Christian
community in activities of the state.
Let's look at some of the interchanges on just war and pacifism,
among, say, Paul Ramsey and Stanley Hauerwas and John Howard Yoder,
on some of these issues. Would it help to think of the theological issues, to
reframe them, in terms of two questions: a first order question, What is the
purpose of the Christian community with regard to the broader society?
And a second, subsidiary, question: What are the limits on the type of be-
havior we can engage in order to further that purpose?
It strikes me that one of the things that would be interesting to ask
Professor Powell is: What is the nature of a good Christian community with
respect to the broader society? In particular, is its obligation simply to bear
witness to God? From this perspective, the obligation of the Christian com-
munity to work for social justice might be very attenuated. If so, that atti-
tude is very different from that articulated by the Roman Catholic
tradition, for example, in Gaudium et Spes, where there is a more positive
obligation for social justice.
One can claim that the Christian community should be engaged in
works of social justice in the world, while still opposing the use of violence.
I remember that Professor Ramsey used to point to some of Professor
Hauerwas's and Professor Yoder's work, at their objections to the use of
force, in the context of just-war theory. One objection they commonly
make is that force just doesn't work-it's not an effective tool. Ramsey
never tired of observing that this objection is not based upon the nature
and purpose of the Christian community. It's a pragmatic judgment about
what's the most effective tool to achieve the same end. So, the first order
question is what's the purpose of the Christian community?
The second order question arises only after we have settled the first
order question. It may be the case that you can say, or we can all agree,
that the purpose of the Christian community, and of Christians within that
community, is to bring the light of social justice to the world. The second
order question asks whether there are some limits on what we can do in
furtherance of that end. A pacifist might agree on that whole vision of
Christian community, but say that you can't kill anybody in order to realize
it. A just-war theorist would say that you can kill, but you can't directly
intend to kill the innocent.
A similar analysis would work with constitutionalism. For example, it is
interesting to ask when John Noonan would need to resign from the
bench. What type of behavior can't he engage in? It is one thing to be a
111 Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
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Constantinian in a general sense, or to say that Christians can in principle
be involved in building and maintaining institutions of the state. But the
interesting questions lie in the details. What particular government, what
particular state, are we dealing with? There is this country. and then there
is Nazi Germany. A Christian's ability to collaborate with the institutions
and goals of each would obviously be very different.
Furthermore, there is also a question about the precise nature of one's
responsibility as a government official. Judge Noonan wrote an article in
the Stanford Law Review called Horses of the Night."12 Some of the lawyers
and judges seemed to think that he was making a very fine-some people
might say Jesuitical-attempt to distinguish between the responsibility of
judges in direct appeals in federal capital-punishment cases, and the more
attenuated responsibility of judges who sit on a federal habeas review of a
state capital case. He suggested that the judges in the federal courts are
not really responsible for the imposition of the death penalty in state cases.
The responsibility of the federal judge is limited to whether the trial and
sentence were constitutional or not. However, now that we have got fed-
eral death-penalty cases, the federal judges would seem more directly re-
sponsible for the imposition of the death penalty.
In short, I think it is one thing to talk about Constantinianism. The
more precise and interesting questions are, What are the terms of a Chris-
tian's morally permissible engagement in this particular society? And when
does even a good Constantinian Christian have to say enough is enough-I
have to resign from the bench? And of course the most radical question
would be-and the Nazi Germany case would exemplify it-when am I per-
mitted to use the power that I hold for subversive ends, in order to achieve
goals that are completely antithetical to the goals of the government that I
work for? Such as staying on the bench so that you can help save the Jews,
Gypsies, and the gays, and all of the people that are the targets, by sub-
verting Nazi laws? At any rate, I think that those are the fundamental ques-
tions that are at stake.
Maura Ryan: Just to underscore what you just said, and to add to it
another question that seems just as important: What is the point at which
one's assumptions about the proper role of the community begin to re-
quire that you use the power of the state in ways that are antithetical to the
ways in which you defined yourself as a community? A further question is,
Where does the temptation lie? That has to be answered as well. It is eas-
ier to see in the question of simple pacifism than it might be if you're
thinking about pacifism in this broader sense.
Shaffer: Could I intervene on that question, and on Cathy [Kaveny's],
too. What is the assumption about the way those questions are answered?
Are those questions asked in the faith community? Is the person guided
primarily by advice from her sisters and brothers in the Lord?
Ryan: I think that is one of the questions that is unanswered in Jeff's
final chapter. That is-there is at one point-I think it is in the discussion
ofJohn Noonan-you make the assumption that the individual Christian is
112 John T. Noonan, Jr., Horses of the Night: Harris v. Vasquez, 45 STA. L. REv. 1011 (1998).
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limited. There are certain kinds of particular limits to what an individual
Christian is going to be able to do in the state. I take it that is different for
what might be possible for the community.
So it would seem to me that you have to answer that: What is the locus
of witness? And how does that relate to these other questions that we've
been pointing to? If, in order to give effective witness, the community as
such is the social ethic, as Hauerwas would say, well then you don't want to
separate-you don't want to make grand claims about what the individual
might be able to perceive to be the case.
Shaffer: Well, then we don't have to have Judge Noonan looking quite
so lonely out there on the mountain, do we?
Randy Lee. 3 It seems to me, Tom, pressing a lot of the same lines-
that this is really helpful conversation. The relation between the church
and the state is not subject to any general formulation. I think it is un-
helpful to say -to use the word-"Constantinian," or "non-Constantinian,"
because it seems to be a matter of constantly making ad hoc judgments,
casuistic judgments on how Christians engage in particular circumstances.
As Maura indicates, it might be a Christian's duty to go to court and
help a person get relief if they are being evicted from their apartment.
And it might also be a duty for a Christian to withdraw, to disengage from
certain practices that have to do with, say, abortion or the death penalty or
something like that. These are judgments that have to be made all of the
time. When it gets down to specifics like this, I think it becomes less clear
whether the church is Constantinian or not. It is just a matter of what
practices does it take to make these decisions well.
Douglas Sturm:114 In response to the discussion so far, I would like to
present three observations for consideration.
First, a critique of Christian exclusivism. In my judgment, we must, in
this day and age, be keenly aware of religious pluralism as a fact and as a
problem. Whatever our ultimate stance, we can no longer simply presup-
pose that Christianity, or some particular version of Christianity, is the only
viable and sensible religious tradition. Yet in our discussion to this point,
we have, I think, tended to privilege the Christian church without so much
as posing the question about what exactly we mean. Since I am a United
Methodist, I suppose I should be considered a Christian. But I find I have
no sympathy with the Christian Coalition-either its theology or its politics.
Moreover, I find myself collaborating with persons of diverse religious
(even anti-religious) persuasions on issues of common concern: racism, se-
xism, classism. We need, I mean to suggest, to work on two related tasks:
(a) to become more explicit about the precise meaning of Christianity we
are espousing and how it diverges from alternatives and (b) to become
more explicit about the precise meaning of interreligious collaboration, its
character and its boundaries.
Second, a critique of Christian sectarianism. In my judgment, Christi-
anity is not concerned about itself as an institution, even as a movement.
113 Associate Professor of Law, Widener University, Harrisburg Campus.
114 Professor of Religion, Bucknell University.
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Christianity instead points beyond itself to something that is not itself.
Christianity points to a relationship between God and the world. In this
case, by "the world" I mean to encompass the whole universe-all creatures
great and small. Christianity refers to the moral impulse to engage whole-
heartedly in a transformative process where the world, for whatever reason,
diverges from the intentionality of divine love. To employ H. Richard
Niebuhr's suggestive typology, Christianity, as I understand it, entails not so
much the motif of "Christ against the world" as it does the alternative motif
of "Christ transforming the world"-for the sake of the world's own well-
being. We are, if directed by Christian insight, inspired to do what is neces-
sary that all life may flourish. We may-we shall-confront all kinds of
tragedies and limitations in pursuing that task, but we are driven to it as
our vocation. From this standpoint, the concern of Christians is not to
defend Christianity, not to make people "Christian," not to protect the
church-but to infuse the structures of the world with the spirit of love that
the world might become a genuine community of justice and peace. It
seems to me, in that connection, that we should direct our attention to
what that might mean in the formation of our common life-political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural.
Third, a critique of the critique of Constantinianism. Given the lead
of Jeff Powell and John Howard Yoder, we have up to this point directed
much of our attention of Constantinianism as our bite noire. Constantinian-
ism, I suppose, stands for tyranny, for arbitrariness in governance, for the
abuse of power as manifested in the formation of the state, particularly
when the state identifies itself as the center of religious authority. Certainly
we must admit the state often functions in that way, sometimes explicitly
and sometimes implicitly. Yet is there any good reason to think that the
state is any less redeemable than any other kind of institution, economic or
cultural? The critique of Constantinianism seems nowadays to be allied
with political cynicism and with a principled anti-governmental sensibility.
The state, it is thought, can do no good; all its policies and actions are
suspect. Over against that kind of sentiment, I would aver that the state has
its appropriate functions to fulfill in our life together and those functions
include not merely the maintenance of law and order, but, beyond that,
doing what must be done to promote the general welfare. In our concern
with the evils of Constantinianism, we must not lose sight of the principle
of the common good and what the state may properly do to honor that
principle.
Indeed, given the perspective I am representing, perhaps we should be
as concerned with other major institutions of our time as much as we are
concerned with the character and limitations of the state. I refer specifi-
cally to transnational corporations that, in their drive for growth and prof-
its, are wreaking havoc throughout the world. TNCs are imbued with their
own value system-some might say their own religious commitment-ex-
pressed in their devotion to quantitative reasoning and utilitarian calculus.
And that system, directly or indirectly, is resulting in the extinction of many
species of life, even, one might argue, the ultimate death of the human
species. If Christianity is, as I have asserted, concerned with the health and
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welfare of the world, then it should be concerned not solely with abuse of
power through the state and its agencies, but also with this other monster,
whatever we might call it-maybe we should call it Mammon-manifested
in the form of the global corporation. Mammon, while it often appears
necessary for life, has become, in its dominant forms in our epoch an in-
strument of death, but it is held in such awe, we are reluctant to make it
responsible to the higher law-which, as I would understand it, is the point
of a rigorous constitutionalism.
Mark V. Tushnet:n1 5 Two comments, both of which follow up on what
Doug just said. One is a minor one, but I think that it may be important
because it ties to something that Joe Vining said at the outset about the
connection between Jeff's concern about constitutional law and ordinary
law. It is hard to complain about the remark of the employer of the women
at the lounge-people don't do this unless they are desperate-but that
indicates the conceptual, analytic crisis: what it characterizes is not con-
fined to constitutional law, because that's contract law. She is in that posi-
tion because of the arrangement of private law in society.
Rodes Actually, what she was doing was forbidden; that is why it went
in front of the Supreme Court.
Tushnet: I understand that, but to the extent that there is the constitu-
tional complaint, there is an underlying, sort of quasi-libertarian com-
plaint, that says she should be allowed to do what she wants to do. Well,
she does it, she is in the position that she is in, because of the array of
private power in society which is governed by private law rather than gov-
ernment law in the way that we ordinarily think about this.
The second point again follows up on Doug's initial comment-and I
want to put this in a way that captures the thought fairly strongly, although
if I had more time I would qualify it in a lot of ways: For me, much of the
discussion in this session has the air of a conversation-I think of it in my
mind as law among the Bora Bora. It's interesting, and as an outsider I can
profit from trying to figure out what it is. But the first and the major quali-
fication is that it turns out that the Bora Bora have jurisdiction over a lot of
folks who are not Bora Bora and they sort of worry about what the signifi-
cance of that conversation is or how that conversation bears on them, and
even how those of us who are not Christians ought to take this conversa-
tion, and what we ought to think of it.
Gaffney: The first thing I wanted to say was suggested by Cathleen
Kaveny's very useful observation about Judge Noonan. She was asking
under what circumstances a judge might recuse himself or even resign his
commission. This comment brought to mind Bob Rodes's comment yester-
day about the meaning of an oath, and Uncas McThenia's first question
about the kind of community we are. Both of those comments were about
integrity and the way that we go about the task of speaking the truth to
power in language that Caesar understands. In short, I think that integrity
115 Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University.
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is not only about feeling good inside or being able to live with oneself. It is
also about witness to others.
For a long time I have suggested that biblical rhetoric should not be
excluded from public discourse. But I am also prepared to acknowledge
that if Caesar were to come to a schul, probably Caesar wouldn't know any
Hebrew. He would not understand Isaiah or Amos or anything else like
that. Or if Caesar came to the United Methodist Church-or any other
Christian community-he may not understand Wesley-or the primary
thinkers and writers of that other community. So we have a task and a duty
of translating some of our concerns into language that the government or
state officials can understand and grasp. And yet the reason I thought that
it was worth mentioning Bob Rodes and Uncas McThenia again, is that
when we try to do that, we are shut off very powerfully at the level of the
Supreme Court discourse. I take it, that is why at the end of the most
fragmentary chapter ofJeff's book, chapter four, Jeff is pressing the conclu-
sion that after all the courts and constitutionalism are just another forum
for Caesar.
I don't agree with Doug [Sturm's] conclusion. Let me offer an exam-
ple. John Noonan represented Louis Negre, n 6 a very conservative Roman
Catholic, who objected to military combat duty in the Vietnam War be-
cause he read Gaudium et Spes, the declaration of Vatican II on the church
in today's world, to prohibit mass killing. Noonan defended Negre's be-
liefs as well grounded in the teachings of his community, but he did so as a
lawyer using the language of Caesar. Noonan argued that the language of
the statute of conscientious objection was a denial of the free exercise of
Negre's right and was an imposition of an establishment of religion by giv-
ing a preference to Quakers or other types of pacifists. We should remem-
ber that just before the Negre case, the Supreme Court had pushed the
envelope of the statute in a remarkable way in its draft cases. 1 7 In Welsh it
construed the statutory term "religious training or belief" to embrace al-
most any kind of commitment to almost anything. That is what happens
when Tom Clark gets his hands on Paul Tillich.
The basis of Louis Negre's faith was that the dying of Jesus and his
resurrection are a transcendent witness to a way in which he must regard
other human beings. That is what it came down to. I got to know Louis.
He was a very, very devout-dare I use the word Christian? He was a fol-
lower ofJesus, who found deep spiritual meaning in the fact thatJesus died
for us and that he did not kill or enjoin us to join a campaign of messianic
slaughter or something like that. IfJesus didn't kill, then Louis Negre de-
cided that he couldn't kill in quite the way that his government was
commanding.
But when Noonan tried that argument, it was met with absolute hostil-
ity and resistance from all on the Court but the son of a United Methodist
preacher, Bill Douglas."18 Jeff is right in urging us to be careful about our
116 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (Negre was one of two petitioners in this
appeal).
117 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965).
118 Gilette 401 U.S. at 463, 470 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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reconstructions of the past. And that must be a good thing to do on its
own terms, because Noonan's experience in the Negre case suggests that
we can't be sure that our efforts to dialogue with Caesar will be successful.
I guess I am then left with the question of whether or not Catholics, just to
identify my own faith community, can either be privatized or totally
politicized, and my answer is that I think both of these alternatives are
wrong. We are simply called to be faithful and to leave the results to God.
Finally, I think Chapter Four of Jeff's book is tantalizing, but not very
complete. Perhaps because I am working at Valparaiso as a Roman Catho-
lic among Lutherans, I find myself reading more and more Reformation
literature. I recently reread The Babylonian Captivity," 9 which I find to be
exactly in concert with what Maura started this off with, Gaudium et Spes. If
what we do, if all that matters is faithfulness for the glory of God, then that
radically changes the vocation of every single one us. In this vision there is
no hierarchy or caste system in Christian spirituality. Questions about who
is on top and who is below, or who is more important and who is not, are
big distractors from the more urgent question of how all Christians exer-
cise their priestly and prophetic vocations. In Luther's vision every task,
whether of a lawyer, or a judge, or whoever, contains the possibility of
openness to grace.
Maybe this way of thinking about vocation would be a useful way of
conceiving of what it is that we are trying to grapple with here, in the whole
enterprise of your book, Jeff. It seems to me that there are several voices
that are missing in that last chapter. Luther would be one. I think that
John Courtney Murray would be another.
Lee:. John [Robinson], if I were a wiser person, I would defer to your
gentle and articulate suggestion to allow those who know something of the-
ology to carry this segment of the conversation. However, good judgment
has never been enough to deter me from storming into uncharted waters.
What has piqued my curiosity in this arena is Jeff's point about the
seduction of the Christian heart by the legal system. 120 Our discussion
here today has only fueled that curiosity. As I listen to this discussion, the
questions I hear asked are these: Do we, as the Body of Christ, approach
Caesar legislatively or judicially? and, How do we, as Christians, prod Cae-
sar to do what needs to be done? I wonder if there is not an alternative
question that we should be asking.
Let me go back to Laura [Fitzgerald's] example.' 2 ' There we have a
desperate woman who is doing a lot of erotic dancing, not of her choice
but out of her financial desperation, and we ask, Should the political sys-
tem have provided her with material goods, or should the legal system now
step in and give her the opportunity to help herself?
119 Martin Luther, The Babylonian Captivity (1520), reprinted in THREE TRFArisEs (A.T.W. Stein-
hauser trans., 1970).
120 POWELL, supra note 10, at 7-8. "American constitutionalism, with its powerful rhetoric of
'justice' and 'equality,' has tempted Christians from the beginning to treat the American political
system as theologically unique, the reflection in the political realm of Christian moral principles."
Id.
121 See supra p. 51.
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I would add to these two questions this third alternative: Why hasn't
the Body of Christ stepped forward and told this woman, "We will give you
an alternative. We will give you an opportunity to support yourself in an-
other way." Where is the Body of Christ in our thinking? I believe that one
result of the seduction to which Jeff refers is that we look to the govern-
ment as this third party that we have to mobilize to heal the world. I won-
der if instead we should be asking ourselves how we neutralize the
government so that the Body of Christ is in a position where it can go and
use its resources to heal the world of its wounds.
If you all would bear with me for a moment, I have an anecdote, told
in mass last week, that touches on this point. There was a woman one day
praying alone in a church. She had no funds, no resources, no assets, but
she needed two dollars to pay for medicine for her sick child. A man
outside the church overheard her prayers through a window and felt
moved to help. He reached into his pocket and pulled out what money he
had left on him after having bought a pack of cigarettes for himself.
The man went into the church and handed the woman the money,
saying to her, "I know your plight, and I want you to have this." The wo-
man thanked the man, and he left. She carefully counted the money and
found that the man had given her a dollar and eighty-five cents. The wo-
man bowed her head once more and prayed, "Lord, next time could you
cut out the middle man?"
Some, I'm sure, will hear that story and think it suggests that if people
try to solve problems without the government, they will always come up
fifteen cents short. I prefer to think that it calls us to look beyond a govern-
mental middle man and trust that Christ's Body in the world is sufficient to
address the world's problems. Such a view should not seem revolutionary.
St. Teresa of Avila, for example, called each of us to be more than the
conscience of the state. She called us to be the eyes, the feet, and the
hands of Christ in the world.122
Sturm: The blunt fact is that if we consider the Body of Christ in its
empirical manifestation-as particular congregations and churches scat-
tered here and there throughout a population-there is no way that pov-
erty can be adequately overcome through the immediate actions of those
groups. They may, to be sure, engage in important acts of charity: soup
kitchens, food banks, thrift shops, housing projects. We should not over-
look the constructive impact of such acts in our everyday life. But, given
the limited resources commanded by those congregations and churches,
there is no way such acts can resolve the problem of poverty throughout
the human community. If we are concerned, for example, to tackle simply
the issue of hunger-of assuring that no one will starve-we need a massive
transformation of our global economic system. That, I would like to think,
is an implication of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that, I
would argue, is one of the paramount works of charity, properly under-
stood, for our time.
122 "St. Teresa's Prayer," on John Michael Talbot, Heart of the Shepherd (Sparrow Corp.
1987).
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Lee: I appreciate your concern, but again, let me acknowledge, and
fall back on, my theological naivet6. I am one of those people who believe
that when a child brought five loaves and a couple of fishes to Jesus, He fed
the masses;1 23 and in that light, I think that we give away the ball game
when we say we do not have faith that the Body of Christ can solve the
world's problems.
I think that we, as Christians, have an obligation at least to try to be the
hands with which Christ feeds and heals people today, and, therefore, our
first response should always be what can we as the Body of Christ do to
solve this problem. If we find that there is nothing that we can do, then
let's go talk to Caesar, and say, "Caesar, you have a problem, and justice or
compassion or even God wants it solved." Maybe God wants us sometimes
to go talk to Caesar, perhaps to keep us humble, perhaps to evangelize
Caesar. But I think we have an obligation first to ask how we mobilize the
Body of Christ to deal with these problems.
Roder. You are trying to get charity for the victims of injustice-rather
than justice. That's the problem you face.
Teresa S. Collet. 124 Two answers. Number one, the empirical record
on political intervention being able to eliminate human suffering is cer-
tainly no more impressive than the record of the church's intervention. So
why do you put your faith in Caesar, rather than God? Based on empirical
evidence, I find this choice rather odd. My second response is based on
one of the lessons I have learned from one of the scholars at this confer-
ence: Justice is a gift that we give each other. The best the state can give us
is only the pale substitute of political coercion and right conduct. If I want
justice in the world, the appeal is not to Caesar; the appeal is to each other.
Sturm: I think of the state as the agency of the political community-
an agency through which community organizes itself and does its work.
And the question is whether or not the state does the work it is supposed to
do. Like whether a lawyer does the work she is supposed to do. Like
whether a teacher-which I have been all of my life-does the work I am
supposed to do. And often times we don't, and we should be called there-
fore to the bar-a wonderful phrase-to be told, "Hey, you know, you are
not a teacher genuinely." The old rectification according to Confucius:
"You are not really a father. This is what a father does." The state is there
as an agency of the community as a whole, in order that the life of all may
flourish.
So I can't think of Caesar as something external. That is part of my
problem. Maybe you're of the Yoder camp-sorry about that, John-and I
am more in Maura [Ryan's] camp.
Shaffer: I think that a lot of the discussion diminishes the pervasive
importance-all through American history, and right now in American
civil religion-of the claim that America is the kingdom of God. This is
123 See, e.g., John 6:1-14.
124 Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Notre Dame.
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God's New Israel, asJefferson said. And that started a long time before the
Social Gospel movement, and it is not diminished, at all, right now.
We had the Star Spangled Banner as the recessional in our church, the
Sunday after the Fourth ofJuly last year. And if you look at this chap who
wouldn't stand for the national anthem at the basketball game, and all the
redneck comments we heard around that issue-"I am a faithful Christian
and I believe in religious rights, but," he said, "this is America." I think,
Mark, that's Bora Bora. That's what ought to worry Jews, if it doesn't.
American civil religion. The rest of us are just trying to figure out what the
church ought to do about it.
Kenneth Craycraft:125 I would like to speak to an earlier comment about
Mennonites saying no to Caesar in Caesar's tongue. The government
would love the practical implications of a Hauerwasian type of position-
until they went to fight a war. Then the state wouldn't be very happy about
it, when the state needs to exercise violence, and needs people who are
going to do it for the state.
Also, I wonder about it in terms of how Caesar likes it that any commu-
nity that is substantial, that's large-if you put it in those terms-how the
state likes it when that community is a group of people who tell one an-
other that the laws of Caesar are laws that are not adequate to their under-
standing of the world. I used to live in Northeast Ohio, very close to large
Amish communities, in which the only reason they are allowed to say no to
Caesar, in Caesar's terms-if indeed it is in Caesar terms; I am not so sure
that it is-is because there are not that many. If there were more, then
maybe Caesar would have to say, "Perhaps we're no longer going to allow
you to say no to us in our terms."
Moreover, saying no to Caesar in Caesar's terms or Caesar's own lan-
guage, itself seems fraught with all sorts of dangers for the church, because
language, among other things, constitutes communities. To say no to Cae-
sar in Caesar's terms, the language that we use, is notjust an expression of
who we are, but also has a constitutive effect on what we become. There is
always that danger of forgetting one language in the process of using
another.
Rodes: We're talking about community, talking about the Christian
community, and then there is talk about church and the state and church
and Caesar. It seems to me that the church and the state are both institu-
tional manifestations of one community. I have a family that consists of
Christians and non-Christians and various other alternatives. I think many
families are like that. I think that my understanding of the community in
which I live is like my understanding of my family. We are all in this to-
gether. There are those of us who are right, and those of us who are
wrong. We are all here together. The church is an institutional form
within that community, and the state is another. I think when the Lord
said that if He found ten just men in Sodom, He would spare Sodom, He
didn't say if He found a community ofjust men in Sodom He would spare
Sodom.
125 Professor of Theology, St. Mary's University (Texas).
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It is our identification with the society in which we live that is part of
the witness to Christ in our society. The church is an institutional form, of
which I am a member, which has some juridical presence that I look to,
and try to organize myself around the rules of, and so is the state.
I understand Tom [Shaffer's] objection to American civil religion,
which I think is a perversion of that. What I see in Gaudium et Spes is that
we are all in this together, and our witness is to the civil community in
which we find ourselves.
Failinger: I was going to say something about a similar theme, follow-
ing on Ed Gaffney's issue. What I found interesting around the room is the
identification of "outsiderness." The two of you argued that Christianity
was privileged and that a Christian was an insider. A lot of other people
argued that Christianity was an outsider group. I would pursue the voca-
tional notion that, wherever you are, you have to always test yourself, and
your institution, as well as to be faithful to your institution. The sort of
paradoxical thinking that Lutheranism does with this problem gets you out
of that dilemma. I think that when you start saying that it is us against
Caesar, there is no self-critique. And you don't know if you are an insider
or an outsider. You might start pretending that you are an outsider, when
in fact you're making exactly the same moves as an insider; you have the
same kind of power. You might not also realize that you have an outsider
responsibility when you are in the elite. You might just forget about that.
You might not make that move, when you should, because you have real-
ized that you are an insider as the inside-outside critique goes, and there-
fore give up on outsider critique. I think that is a better way of thinking
about it.
Graham Walker:126 I wanted to speak to the outsider question, too. I
was very happy that Mark [Tushnet] phrased it the way he did. It seems to
me the answer to the question may be much more subtle than it appears.
I have been in groups where law was discussed, where I, too, felt like it
was "law among Bora Bora," and I am usually the outsider. Actually, with at
least a couple of you in this room identifying yourselves as not being Chris-
tian, this has become one of the few places where the Bora Bora and the
alternative tribes have talked to one another at the same table, which I find
gratifying.
Now, if you are in a group where the strictly secularistic approach to
law is assumed to be the neutral territory, that is a situation hard to break
out of. What you can't break out of there is the spurious claim that those
who consider law from a non-religious point of view somehow have an im-
partial, neutral understanding of things. Whereas the fact is, asJoe Vining
pointed out, that at a high level, all discussions of law involve some commit-
ment to, some understanding of, the whole that we are a part of. It just
happens that this group of Bora Bora has been fairly explicit about its view
of the whole. Being a Christian doesn't seem that ambiguous to most of
those around this table who would identify themselves as such. I am not a
126 NEH Fellow, School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New
Jersey.
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Roman Catholic, but I am certainly one with those who believe that a cer-
tain male human being, at a certain moment in history, was the incarnate
Word of God, and a sufficient revelation of the character of the ultimate
being behind everything. The Christian story is specific, not nebulous.
What makes it so hard in our current situation to talk about the justifi-
cation of legal order as a whole, is that some stories are explicit about their
commitments, and others are not. So it may be that we need to have talks
among the Bora Bora and between the Bora Bora, and other tribes, but
when the other tribe doesn't admit to being another tribe, the discussion
becomes very difficult indeed.
Moreover it seems to me that the concern that Mark voiced, and which
others have voiced, about exclusion of the non-Bora Bora turns out to be a
concern which has perhaps very historical roots in a certain Bora Bora doc-
trine-the outcast and the alien being special objects of concern for those
who stand within the theological tradition of Judaism and Christianity.
Collett: One of the things I liked about what Maura [Ryan] said, and
also I liked about the book, is that they point out the only way I see us as
having a common language, without going back to the Enlightenment. It
is having the common commitment to truth. That is the only way I think
we can define when we have to opt out.
I worry about that a great deal with my law students: Can I be a lawyer
in this culture? Can I be a lawyer in this system? Could I have been a
lawyer in Nazi Germany? I think that many of my students, going beyond
sectarian concerns, see that the only way to create that truly inclusive lan-
guage, without forcing people into false languages, is to talk about truth, of
which our knowledge is only partial, and to accept that your description of
truth (as long as you accept the moral commitment to honestly convey it)
may well be more accurate than mine, because of the vision you have of
your particular aspect. What we need to construct is a fuller understanding
of truth.
IfI as a lawyer have to deny the existence of ultimate truth, I think that
is when I have to opt out, as a believer of whatever faith; I think that's when
civil disobedience has become mandatory. Maura brought that up. I think
that's when John Noonan opts out. In fact, this summer he was asked to
recuse himself because of his Catholicism, and he said, "No, you can't sepa-
rate my faith from who I am." Judge Freeman, a Mormon, arrived at the
same conclusion. I think that it is an issue that is very timely.
Robinson: We're now going to askJeff to respond to the instruction he
so tactfully received. Then we'll respond, to make sure that he got the
lesson.
Powell Thank you so much. This is an incredible experience. Actu-
ally, one of the remarkable things about this conversation is that it is actu-
ally a conversation. One of the reasons I look forward with somewhat
negative emotion to faculty workshops is that so often they seem not to be
conversations but opportunities for people to occupy airspace in succes-
sion, or sometimes simultaneously, and this has been very different from
that, and I thank you so much for the time and thought and concern you
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have shown about matters that are important, even though the vehicle we
used to discuss them was full of flaws.
I want to start with Joe Vining's third question, the question about the
implications for the rest of law, and any conclusion we might draw about
constitutional law from the arguments I made in the book. I think there
are very profound conclusions or implications that arise, that I think we do
face, in the wake of the substantial decay of an earlier tradition grounded
in what Joe calls legal method. We face profound questions of how to go
about the day to day administration of a lot of law.
I take Cathy [Kaveny's] point thatjudges still look like they are getting
things done, and they certainly get decisions made. But I think, across the
broad spectrum of the law, issues about how-for example-to go about
interpreting statutes have become exceedingly difficult. As recently as the
1970s, the courts could still issue opinions, with straight faces on the
judges' heads, about interpreting statutes in the public interest, or inter-
preting statutes liberally in accordance with their remedial purposes. That
language has largely disappeared from judicial opinions because it has
been laughed and ridiculed to death, or virtually so.
The public choice folks, the economic analysis folks, and political criti-
ques of various sorts have left that very traditional, very central aspect of
legal method-the confidence that one can interpret legal documents or
doctrines in accordance with broader common or public interest-in tat-
ters. That confidence has been shattered. I think it is a crucial question
what we do to regain it in some fashion, or substitute something for it, and
I am not optimistic about how well in the long term the legal system will be
able to conduct itself in the absence of finding some means of doing that.
I think that the problem goes beyond law in the strict, narrow sense. I
see it as a lawyer and not a direct participant in the policy debates all the
time in Washington, as policy debate itself suffers from an inability to artic-
ulate the claim that something is for the public goad, something will be for
the benefit of the res publica-except for the claim on the evening news,
not taken very seriously by anyone, cynical in its very articulation.
That kind of thinking, as opposed to the ceremonial and ritualistic
and cynical statements for the news, has come upon hard times, and that
has profound consequences for the conduct of public affairs. If there is no
res publica, on what basis do we make our decisions-other than the results
of naked power struggle?
So I think that there are profound implications in Joe [Vining's] third
question, a question that dovetails with the question about implications
that was John Howard Yoder's question. Well-I am rephrasing it in a way
that you didn't put it-are we being too quick to beat up on what Joe was
calling the mathematical forms of thought, and what I call the rationalistic
forms of thought. My answer is a form of confession and avoidance, an old
legal technique. I think that John [Yoder] is probably right. It is possi-
ble-not onJoe's part but on mine-to seem too negative about rationalis-
tic thought, and that is a mistake. It is a mistake, primarily, because I think
John's suggestion is exactly right: The Enlightenment's origins, the origins
of modem rationalistic thought, are in substantial measure the product of
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understandable and indeed wise historical response to the horrors of early
modern Europe. Religious struggle led, eventually, very slowly, to an un-
derstanding of the horror of oppressing religious and ethnic minorities,
and so on.
So that rationalism's rules, Enlightenment style liberalism, are defen-
sive strategies designed to ward off the dangers of totalizing traditional
forms of thought and political practice. I also thought that Ed Gaffney
made a very nice point, about the way in which the deontological modes of
thought govern thinking being a way of paying respect to difference, both
in the sense of actually enforcing on oneself recognition of others' differ-
ences, and a respect for them, in concrete decisions, and more generally as
a systemic way of providing us with a means of talk and resolution of con-
flict and decision that transcends that particularities of-to use common
jargon-thicker communities or moralities.
Within the law, I want to say one thing about that: Rationalistic think-
ing clearly has an important part. I don't want to throw it out. My point
here is to reverse what I take to be the common arrangement of concentric
circles in people's thinking: instead of rationalistic thought being the
broad, overarching category, it is one particular mode of cognition with its
own value and its own limits that exists alongside others in the law and
indeed elsewhere. So that I am not-although I suppose the book may
suggest-I am not saying that no lawyer should ever craft a rigorously de-
ductive argument, but only that that is not the whole of, or even I think in
the end the center of, traditional legal method. And that if it comes to be
treated as such it is dangerously reductionist.
That brings me to another thought. When I was doing my Ph.D. I was
at a seminar once, sitting next to one of the relatively few people in the
program who shared views similar to mine. Someone was opening up with
both barrels on Kant, and my colleague leaned over and said, "Oh dear,
another round of Kant bashing," which was very common in the sort of
Ph.D. program that I did my doctorate in. Well, I don't think there is any
place for Kant bashing. My concern is that rationalistic modes of thought
have become-in any of number of different forms-traditional liberalism
and public choice theory, just to take two examples-the overarching
schemas by which people attempt to guide thought and action. It is a dan-
gerous reductionism, one which seems to me reduces to a thin level the
rich complexity of human thought and action, and in particular which risks
turning our faces away from the fact that life is lived in the particular.
Somebody-I think it was Bob Rodes-said that for lawyers what really
matters in the end is getting the particular judgment won, in the particular
case. I had a very enlightening discussion years ago, in a conversation in an
interdisciplinary seminar at the University of Iowa, in which I had been
engaged in a fairly heated exchange on whether there was any truth to the
notion put forth by E.P. Thompson that the way in which a certain set of
English statutes was applied in the eighteenth century had played some
relatively benign human role, although admittedly a limited one. After the
seminar was over, I went up to the political theorist with whom I had been
arguing and said I supposed the basis on which we seemed to be disagree-
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ing was that I put a lot of value in the fact that Thompson's argument,
accepting it to be historically correct for the moment, was that in a substan-
tial number of cases these laws, as administered by the lawyers, actually
protected particular people from particular bad things happening to them.
To which the political theorist responded, "That doesn't matter. In the
end, the law is going to bow before political power." And I said, "You're
right, and it does matter. It mattered because the bad things didn't hap-
pen to those particular people." I think one of the dangers of the reduc-
tionism that tempts us today is that it moves us to levels of high theory,
moves us away from the importance, and indeed, for Christians, the utter
transcendent importance, of the particular and the individual.
I want to turn now toJoe [Vining's] second question, about the nature
and meaning of democracy. I completely agree: Democracy is not a given.
It is a construct, and indeed within the American constitutional tradition it
is a legal construct. And one of the things which the book does very poorly
is lay out the way in which the judges were in fact constructing that reality,
while oftentimes, particularly since 1937, acting as if they were protecting a
preexistent reality. You can see that in decisions like the patronage cases,
in which the Supreme Court in the name of the First Amendment has sub-
stantially limited the ability of political officials to employ patronage pow-
ers to hire and fire their supporters. 12 7
From one perspective-and I don't want to argue it either way at the
moment-this is a great gift. You no longer have the mayor getting into
office and firing everybody on down the line. From another perspective
which seems to be equally incontrovertible, what those patronage decisions
do is significantly reconstruct what local democracy is in fact. That may be
good, but one thing that was not noticed by the Court-by the bare majori-
ties that did this-was that it was in fact reconstructing the meaning of
democracy: the majority's mind was on other matters.
Joe asked the question whether the fate of politics is tied up with the
fate of tradition. My answer is, Yes. You're absolutely right. I think I un-
derappreciated the point lying behind the question when I wrote the book.
I'd like to plead that yesterday's lecture 128 was a very small down payment
on trying to think through my answer to Joe's question.
Laura Fitzgerald made a nice point, one that I have done a little bit of
work on in an article published a couple of years ago in the Virginia Law
Review. Your point was this: that our problem really is how to make our
politics constitutional. How to reconstruct a sense of the political sphere.
The political sphere is one in which an argument could be, But that is
contrary to the Constitution's demand for laws that pursue the general wel-
fare. We need to find ways to make that kind of argument salient. And
make it salient in the sense that it is notjust a "political" point, in a deroga-
tory sense, but is a constitutional argument sounding in the political arena.
One other thought in response to your second question, Joe: As I sug-
gested yesterday, law, and particularly public law, is a means by which the
127 Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); see also O'Hare
Trucking Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S.Ct. 2353 (1996).
128 See Professor Powell's lecture, given the day before the conversation, infra p. 82.
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community constitutes itself. I think it was Ken Craycraft who spoke about
how language establishes a community. That is exactly right. The lan-
guage of American public law is one of the central means by which the
American community exists. Of course, in some sense, the American polity
exists as a fact about physical and psychological force. If you doubt it, ar-
gue with the I.R.S. on April sixteenth. There's a fact. But the American
political community like all political communities aspires to go beyond
that, and the American public law is a means by which the community
seeks to realize itself as community, and indeed as democracy or whatever.
Indeed, that process defines what it means to say that this is a polity ruled
by the demos.
As a quick footnote, the thing I don't want to endorse-and maybe no
one is hearing me say this, but let me make it plain: Some people writing
constitutional theory today take care of the perceived problem of judicial
review versus democracy by redefining the word democracy so that the
word simply becomes whatever it is you approve of. I don't think that is a
useful move. It just means the word doesn't have any critical meaning.
I now want to turn to Joe's first point which was about the impact on
practical thought of cosmology. And that directly brings me to Maura
Ryan's powerful questions and comments about the theological basis of this
book. A number of you pointed out in gentle terms the relatively thin and
fragmentary nature of chapter four. You're right. I simply agree with you.
I want to start by saying that I am in total agreement, Maura, with what
I take to be your assertion that a very important aspect of Christianity is
Christianity's commitment to the reality of the common good and our obli-
gation to seek the common good. I am reminded of this, actually quite
frequently, given the kind of work I do as a lawyer, whenever-I am an
Anglican-I am in church. Almost invariably we pray for the common
good. Nowadays, I hardly can participate in that prayer without thinking
about the fact that a substantial body of my fellow academic lawyers do not
believe there is any such thing. Definitionally. It does not exist.
Christians don't have that option. We are committed about it all the
way down. All the way down to an even more fundamental set of beliefs
about God and God's nature, to there being a human common good, and
a human common good that does not just exist on an abstract general
level, but actually exists in terms of the concrete communities in which
Christians and others find themselves. My objective in the book was not to
find some way to recommend that we escape Doug Sturm's point about the
secular world, which would be perfectly happy for Christians to become
quietist. I don't want us to become quietist. Quite the opposite. The ques-
tion is how can we, consistent with our substantive commitments, pursue
with our fellow human beings-who are not members of our religious com-
munity-the common good. A large part-perhaps not all, but a large
part-of what I mean by anti-Constantinian thinking is to try to find a way
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to express the Christian commitment to action for the common good
within the bounds of other Christian commitments. 2 9
I have a number of thoughts that I have failed within the time available
to put in any coherent order. The deepest thing may be something that
worries me a great deal, and it worries me in several different directions. I
think there is a very great danger that we will collapse realities that are
eschatologically one but diverge in this time between the ages-the secular
and the sacred, to use terminology the apparent polar oppositeness of
which I don't want to endorse at all. It is not yet the case that the earth is
the Kingdom of God, and it is emphatically not the case that the United
States of America is the city on the hill, contrary to what a recent president
often told us. I think it is vitally important as a matter of truthfulness, and
vitally important in order successfully to repair and heal this particular
political community, as well as the world at large, that we not make the
mistake of collapsing together things that are not yet united, and have not
yet been reconciled.
There are differences or distinctions. Tom Shaffer's concern about
American civil religion is one aspect of that. American civil religion is one
massive conflation of things that are not yet one. Within constitutional
theory, sometimes by people like Michael Perry who are Christians, some-
times by people who are not religious, we see a similar collapse of distinc-
tions between the perfect community and the perfect constitution in a
totally just society, and the realities, possible realities, of the actual Ameri-
can constitutional order. That is one of the central things that I am trying
to get at when I talk about-when I used to talk about-anti-
Constantinianism.
One incredibly important point has been put on the table, and I am
very glad it was, by Mark Tushnet. Non-Christians are right to fear Chris-
tian social power. They are absolutely right. Christian social power has
been used again and again in history in evil ways. The starting point for
Christian truthfulness and Christian social witness is to recognize that and
to be aware of it, and to let that fact shape our action. It is not in the end a
surprising fact, it seems to me: evil is at its most powerful closest to the
altar, from a Christian perspective; that fact is one we just have to deal with.
We have to deal with the rightful fears and concerns of non-Christians, the
non-Christians who are our brothers and sisters and members of the polit-
ical communities in which God has placed us.
That by itself is an incredibly powerful point, and it connects with an-
other point: The way I put it to myself is that it is important for us to
recognize the legitimate, if limited, integrity of the secular or the penulti-
mate. I don't believe that Christianity denies the integrity of the secular.
This is a point made by St. Thomas Aquinas: Grace does not destroy na-
ture; the secular and penultimate have their own created reality and good-
ness, and it is part of Christian social witness to understand the distinctions
129 What I had in mind were Christian commitments to respect for difference and the other,
to non-coercive social relationships, and to opposition to totalizing claims of authority by the
state.
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between the ultimate and the penultimate. To learn properly to respect
that which is not ultimate.
This is the point Randy, Teresa, and I were talking about last night. I
was asked: Suppose I were ajustice on the Supreme Court, and the coun-
try adopted a constitutional amendment-well crafted by good lawyers so
as to leave no loopholes-eliminating across the board any constitutional
protection for free speech. The question was whether the amendment was
constitutional, substantively constitutional. (We were assuming that the
amendment was legitimately adopted.) I was asked whether I would vote to
hold, on some theory like Walter Murphy's, for example, that the amend-
ment was unconstitutional because contrary to the basic structure of the
American constitutional order.130 My response assumed that no one was
going to ask me the prior question: whether it would bother me all that
much.
Assuming that I think that this amendment was so awful that I would
be tempted, would I so vote? And my answer was: No. In the end the
reason my answer is no is that I think that-and this is a debatable judge-
ment, I know-it seems to me that this particular penultimate secular polit-
ical order has chosen to structure its fundamental law in such a way as to
permit itself to radically change its fundamental law by processes, and were
I then to stand in the way, to use power that the very order gave me to
prevent that order from doing that, I would be failing to respect the appro-
priate integrity of that secular political order. Even if I thought that what it
was doing was contrary to my higher commitments, the question would be
a difficult one, which might then raise the question of my resignation.
Maura Ryan and Randy Lee both pointed out that one of the concerns
that I was raising was a concern about Christian resistance to the seduction
of constitutional law, and the American political order, its pretentions, and
so forth. I think that is something that we need to keep a hold of.
Whether at any particular time we should be more worried about being too
pessimistic about what can be done within and through the American polit-
ical order, or whether we should be more worried about being corrupted
by it, is a question that I agree with Mike Baxter about. There is no general
answer. The answer will always be situation specific.
One theme that I heard again and again in the discussion, and I have
got to do a lot more thinking about it, is a theme that I have an easy way
out of being worried about: It is to say that I am a Protestant in a group
that is largely Catholic, so that what I am hearing is an old Protestant-Cath-
olic dispute. But I think that is wrong. When people talk about Christian
social witness, people often seem to assume that there will be a single uni-
tary Christian social witness. Well, I don't think so, not on a lot of things. I
don't believe, on a lot of issues, including issues that you and I feel very
strongly about, that there is a single, not debatable, without any doubt,
Christian answer.
I don't think there are on a lot of issues, including incredibly impor-
tant ones, single Christian answers, notjust empirically, based on the obser-
130 WALTER F. MuRPHY Ex A AMEcAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 191-92 (2d ed.
1995).
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vation that Christians occupy places on all parts of the political spectrum,
but because I don't think that a lot of questions resolve themselves unmis-
takably within Christian terms that as a Christian I am bound to accept. I
am-and here the Protestant rears his head for a moment-I am fearful
traditionally, historically of us forgetting that, that there is not on many
things a single answer. Indeed I think that one of the greatest gifts that the
Christian community has to give the secular communities in which Chris-
tians live is a model of how community can exist, be created by, and be
constituted by substantive commitments-notjust thin process agreements
of how we are going to talk, but substantive commitments, ones that really
matter. Yet at the same time permit, foster, encourage, live through and by,
disagreement and debate. Now we have not been, I think, notably success-
ful at modeling that sort of community for ourselves, or for anyone else;
but if we were to do so we would, I think, be truer to what we are called to
be, and we would be serving the common good which we share with our
non-Christian brothers and sisters, by modeling a political community that
the wider political community has not achieved and in fact seems to me to
be thoroughly retrograde about.
We have the problem of violence, coercion, all of those issues. I am
not a pacifist. On the other hand, I think that the use of violence as a
means of maintaining or achieving social order has to always be problem-
atic for Christians. That is a waffle word; coercion ranges somewhere be-
tween impermissible and evil totally, to permissible and evil, a necessary
form of participation and guilt. One of the things that my use of the anti-
C[onstantinian] word is meant to remind me of is the fact that I think that
there is not any way to avoid coercion entirely, short of sectarian with-
drawal. There is not any way, given the fact that I am not called to with-
drawal, but I am called to be a part of the broader human community.
That involves me in the messy, dirty, violent realities of that community. I
don't escape my responsibility for that, and in the end I don't achieve some
sort of moral purity, doing otherwise.
Doug Sturm and other people raise the question of justice. Where is
that in this discussion? A couple of thoughts about that: The law doesn't
exist for itself. I think that self-contained notions of law are destructive,
utterly in the end. One of the ways that you can characterize what the law
exists for is to use the word 'justice." Getting down to particularities, the
American legal tradition, and indeed the very tools and methods of legal
method that Joe Vining and I have been talking about, are themselves
laden with what are sometimes implicit moral and political commitments
of all sorts. So that there is no escape into a world of process. We indeed
are always going to be dealing with questions of justice, and we will deal
with them better if we are aware of that and if we tackle them head on.
Recognize that we are in the world, an unpleasant world sometimes, and
unsettling all the time. Real decisions have to be made that really affect
people, hurt people, maybe help people sometimes.
I was very struck by Marie Failinger's analogy or metaphor about legal
method as our liturgy; I rather like that, although you took it in a different
direction than I would have taken it. I thought I heard you saying that
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there is our liturgy--which is how we express how we think-and then
there is what we believe. I think that is more of the way that you formu-
lated it, rather than the way you want to ultimately define it.
Failinger: Yes.
PowelL The formulation itself would not quickly occur to a prayer-
book Anglican since it is the liturgy itself which is the only real expression,
notjust of what Anglicans do when they express their Christian faith but in
fact it is the only formulation that Anglicans recognize as having authority
to state the Christian faith. I think that is true; that is why I like so much
your metaphor. That is true of the law's liturgy, of legal method. It is not
just a way of expressing or trying to point towards the substantive commit-
ments; it is in fact the carrying out of those substantive commitments.
That brings me to my final thought. Despite all that is said about
American law, in the end it is human law, and it is human justice, and I
think Christians, actually I think everybody, is called to seek human justice
as far as it is within our power. Our power that is limited by our limited
and narrow and fallen visions, as well as other external limitations to our
abilities. We are called on to seek in human justice to approximate divine
justice, but were we tempted to think that we can close the gap altogether
we would be starting out on a path that will mislead us. However uncom-
fortable, that's the way it is. What will feel like compromises sometimes-
and no doubt be compromises, given the conditions in which we live-tells
us to acknowledge that that's the way it is. That is what it is to be human
beings in this particular fallen but graced world.
Shaffer: If I understand you right, Jeff, you think that the substantive
discussion of common good in American society now is not likely to be
successful. I suppose the exception is that America seems to get together
pretty well on who they want to kill, or who they want to keep out, but not
on much else. I think it is very sad that Mr. Buchanan thinks of himself as
more an American than Irish, for instance. The Irish have always been able
to get together on more than who they want to kill and who they want to
keep out.
You make the suggestion that the faithful should model-the church
should model the common good for the civil community. I take it from
the context that you mean procedurally. My favorite example of that is
Yoder's hermeneutics of peoplehood, about the way a New Testament com-
munity discusses things. A very particular example, but, I take it, some-
thing like that is what you mean. I wonder if you would say that the faithful
community should model the common good discussion substantively, that
is on what the common good is. I think that Gaudium et Spes leads to that.
That is, we will talk together-the faithful will talk together. The faithful
will go out and bring in the experience of the wider society. Then we will
decide, when the door is relatively closed. We will then decide what the
common good requires, and then we will go out and advance it in
servanthood.
Maybe that is meant by John Yoder's use of a biblical quotation from
Jeremiah, that you seek the faith of the city, seek the good of the city. That
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it is the captive people, there in Babylon who will talk about what the good
is, the common good they will seek. Now does that make any sense at all?
Powell: Yes. I agree with you-
Shaffer: If you can't in the wider society discuss the common good,
you have to discuss it somewhere, and that means that you will come up
with a relatively sectarian notion of what the good is that is common.
Powell: I don't know about the very last point; but up until there, I
agree completely. I had in mind, when I was talking about that, the model-
ing-indeed fostering-of a genuine, caring community, along with sharp
and substantive disagreement. But at the same time I completely agree
that the faith community can and should model debate over substantive
questions. To take the biggest bull by the horns, the question of abortion
and its link to all sorts of other questions; about the distribution of wealth,
the way we deal with illness, etc. All of those questions are ones in which
the broader community is at loggerheads, bitterly divided, and as to which I
would hope that the Christian community could model, because not all
Christian communities agree on those issues.
We can model ways of thinking how do we get at these problems? And
how do we juggle the different concerns that in the broader world, and
among us, are treated as though they should be held apart? So that, for
example, you are only going to stand up for the right of the unborn, and I
am only going to worry about the tragic plight of the thirteen-year-old girl.
We should model bringing these sorts of concerns together, so that we can
think about them truthfully.
One of the things that I think we should learn from our experience,
and can model from our experience, is that models of the common good
that think of it, like models of democracy, as some pre-discussion given, so
that the common good is lying out there and in some literal sense is simply
to be found-It is under that rock-are wrong. Or, if they are right, they
are right in the mind of God, which is not directly accessible to us. The
common good is something that is in substantial measure going to be
shaped and made reality by us together. That does not mean that it is a
relative concept. I am not making it up; but it is not something that is just
out there for objective ascertainment.
Walker: That suggests to me, though, where the analogy between the
community of the Body of Christ and the political community will generally
break down. The Body of Christ has substantive commitments in common,
with its disagreements subsidiary to those common things. That Jesus is
Lord, I guess, is one way of stating the common thing, and the Christian
community does not debate whether or not Jesus is Lord. That is a com-
parative-religion debate, not a debate within the Christian community of
the Body of Christ.
This is unlike the debate in the political community, where if there is
agreement around some common goods that are labeled as such, the very
identity of those goods is under discussion. Would you agree that makes
the analogy inapt, that makes the analogy limited?
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Powe&- The analogy is limited, and all modeling possibilities are lim-
ited, I agree with both of those points. I am not sure we are disagreeing on
that at all. A couple of thoughts: One is that unlike some people I am very
close to personally, and intellectually in a lot of ways, I don't think the
secular community's common commitments are quite as thin and shallow
as they are often portrayed to be. Somebody mentioned earlier today
Rawls and his idea of overlapping consensus. I think there is some signifi-
cant body of agreement.
Also, what I said a moment ago in response to Tom Shaffer is not
meant to suggest that the common good is an entirely constructive matter,
as if, after careful thought about it, we decided that rape and pillage were
good, and mercy and justice were bad, then that would be our common
good. No. I don't think that is the case at all. I want to avoid the mistake
of having in mind one error to reject and therefore moving too far to the
other side of the boat and then capsizing.
My concern is this: Lawyers in America have sometimes thought, in a
naive fashion, that the common good is simply out there to be scientifically
discerned-by a lawyer-certainly not by a politician.
James T. Burtchaell, C.S.C.: 131 A number of people here have identified
themselves as Gaudium et Spes Catholics. I am tempted to identify myself as
a Credo in unum Deum Catholic. I will just say I am a Lumen Gentium and
Gaudium et Spes Catholic.
Maclntyre's account of authentic traditions, practices, and virtues sup-
poses that they are vital elements of an enduring community. The com-
mon law-an amalgam of traditions, practices, virtues-was the progeny of
such a mother-community, for it was unified more by the Catholic Church
than by Britain, whose ethnic diversity was being stabilized during the era
when the English were subduing their unwilling Celtic neighbors in Wales,
Ireland, and Scotland into a forcibly United Kingdom. The Catholics were
community with enough of a common conscience to sustain a common
law. It was a community with a reliably shared sense of analogy strong
enough to develop its sense ofjustice out of a past it both honored and re-
construed.
What assured the disintegration of the common law was the disintegra-
tion of its mother-community, the Catholic Church. It fell apart slowly, but
decomposition was well advanced before the Enlightenment begot the
common law's new rival: liberal American constitutionalism.
The common law had had older rivals: the various Continental laws
that blended the Roman codes with national customaries, and the canon
law. Canon law was the nearer rival. The two jurisprudences had matured
together, by the concurrent assemblage of their respective great collec-
tions. The canon law had more breadth and the common law more com-
pactness, in that the one writ ran so much farther than the other. The
common law had the greater freedom to grow and flourish, since its sover-
eign's statutes left more room to adjudicate than did the canon law's sover-
131 Father Burtchaell is former chairman of the theology department and former provost of
the University of Notre Dame. He now resides and writes in Princeton, NewJersey.
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eign's decretals. But in the long pull the British common law grew in vigor
and breadth-and then emigrated to America, and encountered here the
oppressive influences of the Enlightenment, the industrial revolution, a
cybernetically empowered national state, and contractual individualism,
which all combined to savage and suborn the government, the economy,
the family, and their traditional patroness, the Church.
Constitutionalism has proved to be such a devastating rival not be-
cause it adhered to a fixed, documentary norm, but because in the guise of
a merely procedural code that offered peaceable neighborhood to all par-
ties regardless of their faith or fidelity, it has proved instead to be the mis-
tress of a new creed with disciplined allegiance by doctrinaire believers, a
creed meant to be imposed on all citizens with a vigor and zeal beyond that
of Constantine, or Justinian, or even Decius.
The present epistemological crisis, or impasse, is not a muscle spasm
that has disabled the traditional contention between the substantive tenets
of the common law and the procedural rules of constitutional interpreta-
tion, but the long-delayed discovery by some descendants within that
Church that liberal constitutionalism has become a bully, and that its En-
lightenment imperatives are after all much more substantive than proce-
dural. These Catholics were loath to notice constitutionalism's inclination
toward what Justice White in 1973 described as "raw judicial power." 3 2
Their political future feels the early chill of a long and bleak winter, now
that the political order has become the predator, not the protector, of the
family, the workplace, and the Church.
An illusion has been broken: that this political community was a fel-
lowship wherein we all-or at least most of us-could find enough commu-
nity to feel at home. We had thought ourselves still bound by enough
common understandings and aspirations to be able to wrangle together (as
MacIntyre has described). We had never imagined that so many of our
fellow culturemen would regard our Christianity as an identity we were ex-
pected to repress. Those of us who did once believe ourselves at home
here-who are more disposed to judge the nation's culture by our faith
than our church's culture by our ethnicity-ought now to know that our
citizenship in this unstable national coalition will be bearable only if we
hold to our faith more fiercely, and contend for our standing as a religious
people bound by a closer, shared sense of justice to our fellow communi-
cants across the world than to our fellow citizens in this land. This adopted
nation must now be less a haven than a wild, where we must feel like awk-
ward and wary immigrants.
Jews have seasons when they felt more at home here, and less at home
here. We have usually helped them by alarming them often enough for
them to take good care about themselves and their own solidarity. But
nobody has been doing that for us.
I conclude with an image: Everybody knows thatJohn Quincy Adams
hated Andrew Jackson, and all those other people who, from the time they
got drunk and trashed the White House on inauguration day, began to do
132 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). Although it appeared in
Doe, Justice White's dissenting opinion applied as well to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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that to the whole country. Adams ran for and sat in the United States
House of Representatives. He sat there as a reproach to the Jacksonians,
voted down on everything. Of course, the burnt stump of the New England
aristocracy hated what was going on, and he knew what he counted for
there. But it didn't bother him. He didn't get his identity from any con-
gressional majority. I think that is probably a better patron for the way we
ought to be.
I had a classmate who worked at the Pentagon at the time the Catholic
Bishops first circulated the draft of their letter on peace, which was really a
letter on nuclear arms. And he told me that when it first came out-the
first week-the Navy began to make plans to withdraw Catholic officers
from command positions on nuclear submarines, because all of a sudden
they were stricken with the thought that Catholics were all security risks.
Fortunately or unfortunately, as you see it, within a few weeks they didn't
worry anymore. They realized that there was no risk at all. Catholics
weren't paying any attention to the Bishops, because the Bishops had been
trying so long to preach to the Oval Office that they stopped preaching to
the Catholics, on grounds that perhaps only Catholics could understand.
So I was struck by that story, and wished that my fellow Catholics were
more of a security risk. I think that what's going on under the guise of
constitutional interpretation is as oppressive an imposition as our history
books tell us about. And we will find the gumption and the inspiration to
stand up to it only as a community of belief, not as individual voters or
believers. As a Catholic, I wish that we weren't right now at the other peri-
gee of our cycle, where we have been so anxious to prove ourselves unques-
tioning in our loyalties to some very bad law.
Failinger: The thing that disturbed me about your comments, Jim, was
the move that I now see so many people making: law is the thing to blame
for everything. I don't think law caused the crisis of the church. I don't
think that law caused the crisis of the family, I don't think it maybe helped
those things. Constitutionalism is the actual word you used: I think maybe
it did not help matters in very discrete, particular cases; but it is putting a
lot of weight on constitutional law to try to expect it to reverse the course of
the world.
In that sense, I think the focus on legislation is a more appropriate
focus. It does have a broader aspect to it. Constitutional law is very limited.
It has a broad vision, but a limited remedial power. I think that we
shouldn't make the mistake of choosing constitutional law as the thing to
be dumped on.
One of the things we were talking about is what difference would it
make if we thought about our own faith traditions in relation to constitu-
tional law, or any kind of law? I think one of the reasons we don't do that is
that most of us don't know much about our faith traditions. Most of us
don't articulate the kind of thing that Harold [Berman] was talking
about-what historical tradition do I come from? And why has that made a
difference in law? How could it make a difference in law? If we could be
more religiously or theologically competent, I think that we could contrib-
ute more to this conversation about what constitutional law could be.
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Shaffer: I think it is the case though, that, if what you say is true, it is
because law is a god that failed. If you look at the golden era of American
lawyers, they put that kind of faith in the Constitution. David Hoffman, for
example, speaks of lawyers serving the Constitution as in a temple, and
lawyers are the priest in this temple. He derives a little ethic from that, but
he says that always the Constitution comes first. It is the god.
Walker: We also have to take seriously in that context the power that
the Constitution has in shaping, in telling us a story. It is more often the
case that we are shaped by traditions than that we shape traditions. Tradi-
tions, including constitutional traditions, make claims upon us that we
don't have, that we have not chosen. So the story that the Constitution tells
us about who we are and who we aspire to be has to be open to criticism
and judgment.
Failinger: I just don't think that the constitutional story is very
monlithic.
Haroldj. Berman:133 The constitution of David Hoffman was also com-
mon law. There was for him no great contrast. Isn't that so?
Shaffer: If the constitution was on the high altar, in the center of the
cathedral, the common law was on the side altar. I think thatJeff was right
about that. Those lawyers used common-law method in practicing constitu-
tional law.
Gaffney: On this talk of the worship of the constitution, by the way,
there are a lot of texts gathered by Alex Bickel in his Holmes lectures at
Harvard Law School.134 Bickel talks about the corporate lawyers of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century who praised the sacred character of
the constitution as stretching its beneficent powers over America "like the
outstretched arm of God himself." Robert Bellah would later find in the
political discourse of great American presidents the kernel of what he
called the American civil religion. But what these Wall Street lawyers had
in mind, of course, was that the constitution was to be revered as sacred or
worshipped as divine to the extent that it secured the property interests of
their clients. This fact gets us back to the question of knowing which kinds
of gods to believe in, and when idolatry should be called idolatry. So there
is a danger on that path.
I thought there was a very important point that you made, Harold,
about how a tradition is continuous. Andjim really hit that one powerfully
too when he spoke of the coherence and cohesion found in the glue of
shared narrative. To be sure, the American narrative is full of hubris, and
arrogance, and exclusion, and is demeaning to lots and lots of peoples.
Nonetheless the continuity of the American tale strikes me as a very impor-
tant point. For this reason, Jeff, I was rather jarred by your answer to the
proposal of an anti-free-speech amendment, because however you go at it, I
am sure you think of life as more important than speech.
133 Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, Emory University.
134 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
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Maybe we can use a different hypothetical, and take a different crack
at it. Suppose we had all of the process values in place for the super major-
ity to do an amendment that would enable the Nuremberg laws. Then, I
guess, to get back to what Cathy Kaveny said this morning aboutJohn Noo-
nan resigning from the bench, might ajudge, under your theory of Ameri-
can law as it is now practiced and experienced, sign death warrants and
send people off to the camps to be exterminated under these laws?
Powel I actually think that, with all respect, those kinds of hypotheti-
cals are not particularly troubling because they address the point at which
any decent human being is going to say, Look, what decision is the most
effective way to respond to this monstrous evil? I don't know what your
most effective response would be if you were a judge in that circumstance.
It is going to depend on things like, If I stay in this position, and therefore
am part of this administration, can I effectively defeat part of what this evil
system wishes to do, or in fact do I simply become part of its functioning?
Those are questions that can't be answered-
Gaffney: It is not as easy as you make it to be. I take it that was the
point of Bob Rodes's serious question about whether he could retake an
oath in the 1990s. He could do what Thomas More did: "Let's see the
statute, and see whether or not I can take the oath." He could do that type
of thing. Or he could say, "Oh well, I took that oath back in the forties,
and you know Roe' 35 wasn't on the books then." But for someone like Bob
Rodes, the deliberate, intentional taking of life is a very serious, big, large
issue. I deliberately wanted to give you an easy question. But one could
then ask, "Why do you distinguish your answer from the abortion question,
or the free-speech question," as to which I take it you're prepared to say
that if the court issues Roe v. Wade'3 6 or if a constitutional amendment put
an end to free speech as we know it, that ends our discourse, ends our
narrative, and ends our ability to be continuous.
Powel& It is always open and indeed obligatory upon any human being
faced with monstrous evil to find the appropriate way to respond to it.
Gaffhey: Well, why are not these things of that order? And, if speech is
of that order, then why not religion?
Powel& These questions-the answers, if they were to reach the level of
that order, are too specific to the situation for us to have in the abstract an
answer. I don't have any useful answers, because it depends on the particu-
lar circumstance.
I am willing, for the purposes of the hypothetical, to say, "Okay, I as-
sume the elimination of free speech rights from the Constitution," which
would not, by the way, eliminate free speech. All that it means is that
courts are not going to strike down statutes that attempt to restrict free
speech, so I don't know that it produces, off the bat, any results that I think
are evil.
1S5 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
136 Id.
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Gaff ney: Wouldn't it be within the power of the government to penal-
ize people for speaking their minds and hearts?
Powell: Sure, sure.
Gaffney: Well, penalizing people for speaking their minds and hearts
comes awfully close to penalizing the free exercise of religion, because reli-
gious speech overlaps with political speech all the time. They cross over
and overlap. That is why I was curious about whether your view would ex-
tend to the protection of the free exercise of religion. It is one thing when
the court radically diminishes judicial protection of free exercise in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith.137 It is quite another when you have an overt consti-
tutional amendment that expressly reverses the First Amendment. The
Congress can reply to Smith and did so, of course, in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.138 But your hypothetical, the one that you led with, was a
different one. Suppose we had in place all of the processes whereby we
could get rid of judicial protection of free speech. I understood your
point. It wouldn't be that people couldn't say anything anymore. But they
would go to jail if they said things the government didn't like.
Walker: If such laws were passed.
Gaffney: If such laws were passed. And I guarantee you that in many
municipalities with which I am familiar they would be passed, and they
would be passed tomorrow morning.
Collett But I think the fuller answer would depend on where our loy-
alty lies. Does it lie with the positive law? Does it lie with some concept of
natural law? Where does our loyalty lie as lawyers? My answer to the hypo-
thetical is that I must cast the fifth vote to allow the elimination of political
speech. I, too, believe political speech is the basis of political community:
if I can't talk to you-this involves the points we made earlier-if we have
no ability to talk, then we have no ability to create community.
I find casting such a vote a horrifying idea. Therefore, as I hand in my
opinion, I simultaneously hand in my resignation and join the revolution.
But in deciding how to vote, the question is: Can I corrupt the institution
that, in part, makes it possible to govern ourselves in such a way that, if
political means are successful in reversing such foolishness, the next person
who occupies this seat may vote to disregard the reversal? Do I deny the
people's ability to make the wrong decision through the power that they
gave me? What I heardJeff say is that he agreed with me. He casts the fifth
vote. Perhaps you don't even cast the fifth vote; perhaps you resign before
you cast the vote-but you don't corrupt the institution; you resign and
fight the revolution, if that's what is necessary.
Powell: I agree with that. The reason I resist Ed Gaffney's hypothetical
lies in something I have already said. Ijust want to repeat it Loyalty to the
law, loyalty to the particular office that one exercises in this particular secu-
lar political order, or any other, is not an ultimate faithfulness. It is subject
to higher and deeper commands and obligations, and at some point one
137 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
138 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
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plainly has conflicts such that one must-and I am not saying that it would
be easy in many circumstances-but one is under an obligation to act in
whatever is the wisest and most effective way to resist the evil. That is why
in the end I don't want to answer the question: because it doesn't have any
answer that is anywhere in between recognizing that one must fight mon-
strous evil and knowing enough facts about what I should do in a particular
circumstance.
Here the conversation was brought to a close. Professor Powell's lecture, which
appears next, was given the day before this conversation.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Lo YAzL7 TO THE LA w.,
POLITICS AN/VD THE PRA cTIz. OF PUBLIC LA waER/G
IN THE UNITD STATES
by H. Jefferson Powelil 3
I want to talk today about a concept that I'm going to call loyalty to the
law. What does it mean to be committed to the law, to bear it allegiance, to
reach legal conclusions faithfully? Indeed, is any of this possible? And, if
possible, is it desirable? Should any of us wish to be the sort of person who
is loyal to the law?
This is my ultimate topic, but I hope you will bear with me if we go
about exploring it in what may seem a somewhat circuitous manner. Let
me add that this indirect approach is not the product of perversity, but of
the manner in which the question of loyalty to the law has arisen in my life,
first as a teacher of constitutional law and then, over the past several years,
as a lawyer for and in the federal government. This has not been for me an
abstract question at all, and I am afraid that it will quickly become apparent
how far I am from a clear answer. But then that is part of the point of a
gathering such as this, to listen as well as to speak.
I
It is one of the oldest boasts of the United States political system that it
establishes a government of laws and not of men. This assertion, in sub-
stance or in the very words, runs throughout the political discourse and the
constitutional documents of the era of the Revolution and the early Repub-
lic. In part the assertion set up a contrast between European tyranny and
American freedom. In the old world, Americans told themselves again and
again, government was the master, driven by the arbitrary will of monarch
or ministry. In the new world, in contrast, government was the servant, its
officials the mere functionaries of laws that were themselves the expression
of the sovereign freedom of the people. "A government of laws and not of
men" quickly became critical as well as celebratory, a norm against which to
measure the success and even legitimacy of American government as well.
The political system of the United States dethrones men in favor of laws to
the extent that it successfully subjects the men and women unavoidably
entrusted with power to the constraint of written laws, and above all to the
supreme law ofa written constitution. When Jefferson attacked Hamilton's
bank bill in 1791 as unconstitutional, he characterized it as not only ex-
ceeding Congress's powers but as a denial of any legal limit whatever to
those powers: "to take a single step beyond the boundaries . . . specially
drawn around the powers of Congress" by the written law of the Constitu-
139 Professor of Law and Divinity, Duke University.
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tion, Jefferson wrote, "is to take possession of a boundless field of power,
no longer susceptible of any definition."'140
In the early Republic, the principle of a government of laws and not of
men was often employed as an argument going to the substance of a polit-
ical dispute. Almost at once, however, the principle acquired an institu-
tional gloss. Even in a government of laws and not of men, officials often
must act at discretion, according to will or policy, and when they do their
actions generally are beyond legal question, however subject to moral or
electoral constraint. When those same officials act subject to legal rule, in
contrast, their actions are open to judicial review and correction because,
in Chief Justice Marshall's famous pronouncement, "[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."141
In short, the distinction between law and politics, so familiar and so central
to subsequent constitutional discussion, was born.
Just as the contrast between "a government of laws" and one "of men"
was never a neutral category scheme, but rather a form of evaluation and
criticism, so from its beginning the dichotomy of law and politics operated
as a commendation of law and a condemnation, however muted, of poli-
tics. Behind the contrast of law and politics lies a contrasting set of images
the more powerful because they are unacknowledged. The sphere ofjudi-
cial decision according to law is the realm of reason and judgment, not
force and will, the realm of cool and disinterested obedience to the laws
and to the people from whom the laws derive their authority. The sphere
of politics, on the other hand, is the realm of ambition, faction, self-inter-
est, and struggle; of choice, not obedience; passion, not reason. However
odd for a political system built ostensibly on the political enfranchisement
of the people, almost from birth American political culture incorporated a
distrust of politics.
As I've already suggested, the translation of laws versus men into law
versus politics served and shaped the emergence of the judicial review of
political action. Judicial review is often thought of in terms of its utility in
the protection of individual rights. Important as that function has been,
however, the still more fundamental role of public law has been to separate
the spheres of law and politics, by defining and limiting the realm of poli-
tics by legal rule. Despite the existence of broad arenas in which legislative
and executive will and policy hold sway, the American political order is a
"government of laws and not of men" because public law pronounced by
courts controls the boundaries of the political sphere. As Justice William
Johnson wrote in 1808, "[i]n a country where laws govern, courts ofjustice
necessarily are the medium of action and reaction between the govern-
ment and the governed." 14 Judicial enforcement of public law, Johnson
explained, is the means by which the political order gives institutional real-
ity to the supremacy of law over politics.
140 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank
(Feb. 15, 1791), reprinted in H.JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCEBOOK OF AMERI-
CAN CONSTrTUTiONAL HIs'roRy 42 (1991).
141 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1808).
142 WilliamJohnson, Public Statement (Aug. 28, 1808), in PowELL, supra note 10, at 236.
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The courts do not pretend to impose any restraint upon any officer of
government, but what results from a just construction of the laws of the
United States. Of these laws, the courts are the constitutional expositors;
for laws have no legal meaning but what is given them by the courts. 143
After the earliest period, there was only sporadic disagreement with
the general assertion that the courts could and should safeguard the gov-
ernment of laws by policing the boundaries of the political. Consensus on
the theory, however, did not mean agreement in practice, and almost from
the beginning those disappointed by the courts' interpretations of the Con-
stitution and laws have frequently concluded that the problem lay in the
perversion of legal judgment by the political preferences of the judges.
The courts' interpretation of the laws can become a mask, Americans
quickly came to fear, for the surreptitious reimposition of a government of
men. Jefferson's attacks on Federalist judges as "the corps of miners and
sappers" undermining republican government are well known.144 Judges, a
Philadelphia newspaper explained in criticizing one of Jefferson's judicial
appointees, can "give the law an explanation perverting its intention" in
accordance with "their own perverse will" through "the wretched subter-
fuges and equivocations of this subtle class of men."14 5 If the courts are to
protect law from politics, therefore, it has always seemed necessary to find
some means for preventing the judges from becoming politicians them-
selves. Selected through politics, the judges must nevertheless be loyal to
the law.
One solution to this problem is exemplified by the explosion of writ-
ing in constitutional theory over the past couple of decades. A great deal
of this scholarship is plainly driven by the fear that the legitimacy of our
government of laws and not men has been put in question by uncon-
strained judicial choice. And the solution proffered by the theorists has
been to conceive of the problem as one of technique, of spelling out the
correct methodology for ensuring legitimate, law-rather-than-politics deci-
sionmaking on the part of the courts. True, the theorists acknowledge,
nothing prevents a dishonest judge from ignoring the correct method, or
pretending to follow it while in fact insinuating his or her political prefer-
ences into a court's decisions. But agreement on the correct method
would enable the honest judge to avoid inadvertent political willfulness,
and permit others to detect and demonstrate the presence of political
choice.
Despite the remarkable intellectual energy that has been directed to
this search for a technique of decision that ensures loyalty to the law, the
search has been a failure and I believe there is no realistic hope that the
goal can be reached. There is no agreement on the correct theory, and the
more prominent the candidate the more withering has been the criticism.
Further the one consistently telling criticism of each proposed methodol-
ogy has been its inability in fact to constrain judicial choice. Even on their
143 Id. at 237.
144 See, e.g., 1 CHAR~.Es WARREN, THE SuPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 546 (rev. ed.
1928).
145 Philadelphia Aurora, reprinted in POWELL, supra note 10, at 232.
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own terms the theories either permit wide latitude for political choice or
effectively abolish judicial review altogether. And finally, the judiciary as a
whole has shown absolutely no inclination to bring its administration of
public law within the confines of any particular theory or technique.
The judges' lack of interest in the work of the theorists is a fact that I
think deserves more attention than it gets from most scholars. An impor-
tant source of this judicial attitude, I think, is that the judges have always
intuited what the theorists are reluctant to admit, that there is no techno-
logical means of excluding politics from law. The traditional judicial ap-
proach to achieving loyalty to the law has been moral, not technical, in
character. By a set of ideas and images, American judges have endeavored
to cultivate loyalty to the objectivity, rationality, and neutrality of law, and
distance from the passion, willfulness and self-interest of politics. And the
most powerful image which they have invoked is that of the judge as the
disciplined spokesperson of an apolitical law.
Law professors often speak contemptuously of "oracular" theories of
judging, and indeed some expressions of the judge as lex loquens cannot be
taken too seriously, but the criticism is too shallow and contempt is out of
place: much of the time what is being expressed is a profoundly moral
commitment to acting not from and on behalf of the judge's personal poli-
tics or faction but in service to the community, to the government of laws
and not of men. This image, of the judge or court as speaking for the
community, is very old. Writing in 1794, in one of the very first cases of
judicial review of legislation, the great Jeffersonian jurist Spencer Roane
wrote that in cases of public law judges "are bound to decide, and they do
actually decide on behalf of the people."146 Two centuries later, a federal
circuit judge wrote for his court that "j]udges speak the voice of the law.
In doing so, they speak for and to the entire community."147 Invoking this
image does not make it so, of course; the implicit hope has been that incor-
porating it into a complex, ongoing tradition of thought and discussion
might make the image part of the judge's life, shaping or reshaping the
springs of decision.
To a moral commitment to act for the community as a whole and in
service of its governance by law, American judges have usually added a
commitment to act with a cautious mistrust of their own freedom from the
subtle pressures and appeals of political preference. Consider, for exam-
ple, Justice Harry Blackmun's comments in his opinion in Furman v. Geor-
gia,148 a seminal death penalty case. Rejecting arguments about the
inefficacy and barbarity of capital punishment, Blackmun wrote
This, for me, is good argument, and it makes some sense. But it is good
argument and it makes sense only in a legislative and executive way and
not as as judicial expedient. [I]f I were a legislator, I would do all I could
to sponsor and to vote for legislation abolishing the death penalty.... I
do not sit on these cases, however, as a legislator .... We should not
146 Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 39 (1793).
147 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 628 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc), rev"d sub nom. Houston Lawyers Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
148 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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allow our personal preferences as to the wisdom of legislative and con-
gressional action, or our distaste for such action, to guide our judicial
decision in cases such as these. The temptations to cross that policy line
are very great.' 4 9
Observers often dismiss this sort of language as naive or written in bad
faith: the very judge who piously utters such platitudes this time will be
pressing his or her "personal preferences" in the next case. Once again,
however, I think that the criticism is partially correct but too shallow. Jus-
tice Blackmun and the many judges who have expressed similar sentiments
are not asserting a Pollyanna-like unwillingness to acknowledge the role of
personal preference and prejudice in judicial decisionmaking but some-
thing rather the opposite: a kind of asceticism of the mind and will that is
meant to respond to and check the "temptations" of politics.
Perhaps the most flamboyant exponent of what I take to be the judges'
own traditional answer to the law and politics problem was Felix Frank-
furter. Frankfurter's opinions while ajustice on the Supreme Court often
discuss at length the judge's duty to subordinate his individuality as a polit-
ical person in order to be able to speak for the legal tradition, but his most
striking image was formulated in private correspondence.
I have an austere and even sacerdotal view of the position of a judge on
this Court .... When a priest enters a monastery, he must leave-or
ought to leave-all sorts of worldly desires behind him. And this Court
has no excuse for being unless it's a monastery. 150
The picture of Supreme Courtjustices as political monks is so extreme
and so imprecise a description of their actual behavior that it may seem a
bit silly, but I believe that Frankfurter was stating in his typically overheated
way a view broadly shared in the American legal tradition. Judges should
put away politics when they ascend the bench and their failure to do so is a
fall from the purity of the law to which they should profess loyalty.
As I've no doubt already indicated, I have a great deal more sympathy
with the judiciary's moral resolution of the problem of loyalty to the law
than I do with the various solutions by technique of the theorists. Even in
overstatements like Frankfurter's monastic imagery there is a sort of high
moral seriousness, a noble aspiration to subordinate self to the needs of the
community. But in the end, the judges' approach is not an answer, or at
least not a complete one, for several reasons. First, many observers would
say that the judges' efforts to exclude politics from law by moral effort have
not been notably successful over time and in any event are in an advanced
stage of decay at present. A line of moral thought unable to shape deci-
sively the moral practices to which it is directed is of dubious value to
anyone.
Secondly, the judicial aspiration of abstention from politics renders
incoherent or impossible the judicial task in cases in which the standard
tools of legal interpretation do not provide a clear resolution, that is to say,
149 Id. at 410-11 (dissenting opinion).
150 Felix Frankfurter, quoted in Mark B. Rotenburg, Politics, Personality and Judging: The Lessons
of Brandeis and Frankfurter on Judicial Revi, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1863, 1863 n.1 (1983).
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the very cases we are worried about. Phrased as the judges often put it, the
injunction to make decisions according to law and not politics is by itself
empty. Viewed apart from the interpreter's broader moral and political
commitments, the "law" to which the judge is instructed to adhere is inde-
terminate in such cases, a cipher, incapable of guiding decision.
Fundamentally, however, I am not satisfied with the judiciary's solu-
tion because it is flawed in its very conception. To explain what I mean, let
me ask you to recall the basic argument up to this point: the United
States's political order aspires to be a government of laws not of men. In
order to safeguard this aspiration, the political order has accorded public
law, administered by the courts, the tasks of separating the spheres of law
and politics and of confining the political by the legal. And judges have
striven to enable themselves to execute these tasks by trying to renounce
the political out of loyalty to the legal. At each step there is a dichotomy
and a choice, and at each step after the first, the dichotomy and choice
denigrate politics. Inscribed in the entire enterprise, as indeed in the par-
allel efforts of the constitutional theorists to specify a methodology of deci-
sionmaking, is a fundamental fear and dislike of the political, of the world
of passion, interest, disagreement, struggle, compromise, choice.
It is a bit startling to notice that a political order rests on a devaluation
of the political, but the problem goes deeper than paradox or irony. The
mainstream American legal tradition's understanding of loyalty to the law
is fundamentally Manichaean. The implicit images it ascribes to politics
will be familiar ones to the theologians here: the American legal tradition
has restated in a modern and institutional context the ancient dualistic
dislike of the world of change, passion and particularity, and it has revived
as well the ancient dualistic solution of sharply dividing the eternal and the
temporal, the pure and the dirty, the spiritual and the earthly. Ancient
Jewish and Christian opponents of dualism could have predicted the conse-
quences. The American legal mainstream's implicit strategy for achieving
the deepest moral purpose of the system of law has been to identify a spiri-
tual elite and then to impose on that elite an insupportable and ultimately
disabling demand for purity. The resulting mix of arrogance, failure, self-
deceit, and loss of faith should be no surprise.
One conclusion that could be drawn at this point is that the problem
of loyalty to the law goes all the way back to the starting point I identified at
the beginning of this lecture: the ambition of establishing a government of
laws and not of men. If men were angels no government would be neces-
sary, Madison wrote. 51 But men and women are not angels, and any gov-
ernment they fashion will be a matter of politics, a government of men and
women and not of laws. There can be no autonomous role for law in soci-
ety, and consequently no place for loyalty to it. There are political, moral
and spiritual demands on our capacity for faith and commitment, but the
notion of professing allegiance to the law is empty or pernicious.
151 See THE FEDERALST No. 51 (James Madison).
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II
The conclusion I've just outlined as a possibility has a number of ad-
herents within the legal academy. At first glance, indeed, it seems to pres-
ent a coherent if admittedly nontraditional understanding of the role of
judges: at least in cases with a controversial political aspect and a debatable
resolution, judges are simply politicians, who must and should act to ad-
vance their own views of the best political outcome. I don't want to dwell
on the numerous objections to this view, which are amply stated in the
voluminous theoretical literature. Let me simply note two points. In addi-
tion to all the other objections, the view ofjudge as simply politician seems
to me to define the office ofjudge in a morally objectionable light. At least
as long as the ideal of a government of laws and not of men retains its
cultural significance, judges who understand themselves to be politicians
must make decisions at times that'are faithless to what the political commu-
nity as a whole views as their duty. This is a recipe for personal moral
catastrophe. It is the conclusion that for judges to do their jobs they must
decline to keep faith with their fellow citizens.
The other point I want to make is that I do not think the judge-as-
politician view can be confined to some set, small or large, of politically
controversial decisions. Once accepted, I think that this position will eat
up all reasons for subordinating one's "personal" beliefs about the right
outcome in any case to the outcome that ostensibly results from application
of traditional legal argument. Once the aspiration of loyalty to the law is
emptied of meaning, it is difficult for me to see why ajudge should decline
to follow her political inclinations whenever she can. And in short order, I
suspect that judges would not feel any hesitancy in doing so, regardless of
whether their inclinations rest on high moral principle or narrow partisan
allegiance. If we surrender the aspiration of loyalty to the law, we will in-
deed give up any distinctive place for law at all.
III
At this point, I want to turn away from judges and consider a branch of
the legal profession with which I have first-hand experience: public law-
yers-by which I mean lawyers who are government officials although not
judges (or legislators, let me add). Public lawyers have historically been
understood to act at least in part on the basis of loyalty to the law, and yet
at the same time they carry out their duties within a political branch of the
government and in response to political officials. Indeed, most public law-
yers at the decisionmaking level within the federal government are political
appointees who serve at the pleasure of a senior political officer.
The deep dualism of American thought about law and politics has cre-
ated two schools of thought on the role of the public lawyer. On the one
hand are those who assimilate the public lawyer to the common image of
private counsel as primarily the servant of the client, not of the law. As one
commentator has asserted, no doubt quite accurately, the ordinary presi-
dent "expects his attorney general ... to be his advocate rather than an
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impartial arbiter, ajudge of the legality of his action."' 52 Taking this view
to its logical extreme, the lawyer for the government should not be ex-
pected to profess any genuine loyalty to the law: she is, and her words and
deeds should be interpreted as those of, a partisan. There is on this view
no real problem of tension between law and politics because the public
lawyer's true allegiance is to politics and her relationship to law purely
instrumental.
The opposite view is held by those who believe that public lawyers, like
judges, are above all called to put loyalty to the law above any commitment
to the politics of the administration in which they serve. In recent years
this perspective has been associated in particular with the office of the
United States Solicitor General-a well-known book called that officer "the
tenth justice"' 5 -but the image of the public lawyer as a quasi-judicial fig-
ure is often applied quite broadly. Many descriptions of President Ford's
distinguished attorney general, Edward Levi, capture this image. "He is
not a partisan. He is beholden to no one. For too long politics has been
permitted to intrude into the Justice Department" 54 He provided
"thoughtful, nonpolitical and highly principled leadership."' 55 (Note how
that sentence juxtaposes and almost equates the "highly principled" with
the "nonpolitical.") Levi himself stated his ambition to "make clear, by
word and deed, that our law is not an instrument of partisan purpose."'156
This view of the public lawyer as apolitical shares the same nobility of pur-
pose as the ideal of the apolitical judge, and it suffers from the same
problems. The problems are exacerbated by the fact that unlike federal
judges, public lawyers, at least high-ranking ones, are as an institutional
matter clearly within the realm of the political.
The law/politics dichotomy produces, even more clearly for public
lawyers than for judges, a debilitating and ultimately unworkable split be-
tween different aspects of theirjob. Let me illustrate by referring to three
major tasks of the office in which I serve.157 We spend much of our time
advising political officials how those officials can achieve their policy goals
within the bounds of the law. A second important duty consists in predict-
ing how courts, legislators or others will evaluate the lawfulness of pro-
posed action by the executive branch. Perhaps most importantly, we
regularly address questions of lawfulness per se.
None of the activities I've just mentioned can be done well-none of
them ultimately can be done at all-if politics is truly to be excluded from
the undertaking. The tracing of a satisfactory path to a policy objective
through lawful means is often fraught with choices that are themselves
political and moral in nature, and the task often requires that the lawyer
152 Arthur S. Miller, The Attorney Cneral as the President's Lawyei in ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UN1TED STATES 52 (Luther A. Huston et al. eds., 1968).
153 LINcoLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOucrrOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1987).
154 Quoted in NANCY V. BAKER, CONF1CTrNG LOYALTIES 148 (1992).
155 Id. at 150.
156 Id. at 145.
157 At the time I gave this lecture, I was Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel, United States Department ofJustice. The views I express, of course, are not nec-
essarily those of the Department ofJustice.
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share the objective, at least for the purpose of devising and providing ad-
vice. Accurate prediction about whether other governmental entities will
accept the lawfulness of a proposed action or policy depends in part on
informed and ultimately political judgment about how the individuals who
make up those other entities will balance issues of law, policy and partisan-
ship. And like judges, we sometimes encounter questions of law that have
no determinate answer based on the legal materials narrowly construed
and that as a result require the interpreter to go beyond those materials to
the deeper moral commitments of the American political order. Unlike
judges, however, public lawyers cannot displace political responsibility for
their legal conclusions in the name of judicial deference to democratic
choice and to elected officials-considerations that by definition do not
apply to someone who is not a judge and who is ultimately responsible to
elected officials who exercise power by virtue of democratic choice. Poli-
tics is inseparable from public lawyering.
At the same time, effective public lawyering is not simply politics, or
advocacy for politicians. The politics that is inseparable from public lawy-
ering is not mere partisanship, nor is its purpose to advance the personal
fortunes of the officials who are the public lawyer's immediate "clients."
Public lawyers are called to be lawyers, not campaign workers or even pol-
icy analysts. Let me illustrate. Even the most brazen political officer in our
culture scarcely can assert that the law places no limits on his or her discre-
tion to act. Implicit in the political question How can we achieve this goal?
is the awareness that law, or if you please, people's understanding of the
law, is going to channel any plausible response. And ultimately, although
politicians do not like being told no, to an extent perhaps surprising to
those outside government, they are unwilling to act against legal advice.
They expect to be told if the legal justifications for a proposed action or
policy are implausible. The public lawyer who views law as nothing more
than a set of rhetorical tools to be used in whatever manner necessary to
serve his or her political masters is an unsatisfactory servant in the long
run. One cannot engage successfully in the tasks of the public lawyer sim-
ply by saying what will satisfy the political questioner in the short term.
And finally, with considerable frequency, the question the public lawyer is
asked is simply, What is the law; is it lawful to do this or that? What the
political client often wants is law, not simply politics. To do her political
job, the public lawyer must find some way to be loyal to the law.
The public lawyer is thus in much the same quandary as the judge:
there is no way to exclude politics in the sense I am using that term, by
technique or by moral effort, and yet the very shape of her tasks assumes
that law is not simply politics.
IV
I've now wound my way back to my starting point: what is loyalty to the
law? Most of the answers in wide circulation are deeply unsatisfactory, in-
cluding the despairing or cynical conclusion that there can be no such
loyalty. What are we to do? What, to be personal, am I to do when I return
to my office later this week?
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The answer, I think, begins with attempting to reject the dualism of
good law and dirty politics that has dominated our thinking on these mat-
ters. The ideal of a government of laws and not of men-or at least any
ideal worth having along those lines-does not require the rejection of the
realm of policy, choice, faction, debate, compromise. The realm of politics
has all of those features, and because men and women are indeed not an-
gels, it is therefore a realm in which the selfish, the partial, the partisan and
the unreasoning can exercise their sway. But the political means by which
men and women of limited vision and imperfect sympathy struggle to-
gether to shape their common life are not in themselves evil: they are
rather the necessary conditions of any common, human life that is not
ruled by tyranny, naked or cloaked.
At the same time, the common life of the political community is im-
perfect and stands under judgment. At our best, our successes are partial
and our agreements fragile. The political struggle can and predictably will
produce injustice, oppression and neglect much of the time. Understood
rightly, the ideal of a government of laws is the search for a solution-
however partial and itself political-to the pathologies of politics. The
American answer historically has been to channel a significant part of polit-
ical debate into the structured and stylized form of politics that I've been
calling public law. Loyalty to the law is the public lawyer's commitment to
the political as more than simple factional struggle, as an activity that tran-
scends civil war by other means, as part of the political community's effort
to realize itself as a community. Over a significant range of the political
questions with which this society must deal, the potential answers to those
questions are stated and decided through the language of the law.
Like any language, American public law shapes and limits what can be
said. To be recognized as a proposition of law, a moral or political claim
must be articulated through the modes of legal argument, which therefore
provide a sort of grammar for legal debate. Furthermore, a great many
hypothetical propositions of law are grammatical, if you will, but implausi-
ble, in the sense that very few speakers of the language would take them
seriously. Most importantly, like any language, American public law is inco-
herent without a commitment on the part of its speakers to good faith com-
munication. We do not have to agree on our policy choices in order to do
law together, but we do have to share a desire to make law work as a means
of communication and debate. Loyalty to the law is a commitment to
maintaining the law as a functioning system of argument, as what Alasdair
MacIntyre terms a tradition, "an historically extended, socially embodied
argument" constituted by "continuities of conflict."158
Since this inquiry's origins lie in my personal experience, let me close
by reflecting on some of what I have come to understand loyalty to the law
to mean for the public lawyer. To be loyal to the law, I need to insist that
the propositions of law I advance are grammatical and plausible, articu-
lated through the complex modalities of legal argument and capable of
being taken seriously by a fair-minded listener. This responsibility is part of
what I owe to my contemporaries, not just those in the administration I
158 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MoRAL THEORY 222 (1981).
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serve but the administration's critics as well. Beyond being plausible, in
order to be loyal to the law, I need to take seriously what has been said
before. I am part of a conversation, one that involves the judges and public
lawyers of the past. Their reasoning and their conclusions often do not
determine myjudgments, but my commitment to the task I have inherited
from them imposes a duty to understand and account for their views and
decisions. Again, to be loyal to the law, I must keep faith with the future.
The arguments I make and the advice I give can clarify or obfuscate, build
up or corrode, the common language of the law that I will hand on to my
successors. Finally, to be loyal to the law, I must remember the limits of the
law. I have in mind-in part-the law's manifold flaws as a means of com-
mon deliberation, its frequent failures to achieve its goals, the temptations
it poses to manipulation and heartlessness. But the law's virtues are as lim-
iting as its flaws. The law is a craft, but woe to the lawyer who builds her life
on pride in her skill at her craft. Loyalty to the law as a self-contained
system is ultimately destructive, of the lawyer and of the law. It becomes
forgetful of the weightier matters of the law: justice, mercy, and faith. It
becomes a betrayal of the wider loyalties to which we are summoned, to our
brothers and sisters, to God.
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